Sweeney: Professor Stern, could you provide me with
some information on your background? - your undergraduate and graduate
education and any other careers you might have considered other than teaching?
Stern: Well, as this is a rather
general type of question, as far as the undergraduate background, I
graduated from what was then New York State College for Teachers and
what is now SUNY at Albany, State University of New York at Albany,
which was at that time a rather small institution of about 1800, and
now it runs almost 70,000. And did my graduate work at Maxwell School
of Citizenship in Syracuse University. Half of the ones at the graduate
school went into teaching; the other half were aiming at public administration
careers. I never particularly thought of a public administration career
as such and didn't start out college, actually, with the intent of teaching,
thinking more in terms of science, but shifted from there to mathematics
and from mathematics, under the influence of a professor who later became
a college president, Dr. Donald Smith, I became interested in history
and political science more than I was previously in science and mathematics.
So that's why I shifted, although I did complete an under graduate major
in mathematics. But as far as career is concerned, I would say that
it really wasn't until I went into graduate - well, upper level undergraduate
- and I went into graduate school because, like a lot of people in the
1930's, I just couldn't get a teaching job. If I could have gotten a
teaching job at $1200 a year, I would not have gone on to the graduate
school. I hope that answers that the way you want.
2
Sweeney: Could you describe the position that you
held with the state government of New York State studying industrial hiring
and working potential in the industrial areas of the state?
Stern: Well, the title was junior
economist. I was called a metropolitan area analyst in New York State.
I worked, probably with the longest title I ever held in my life, because
I was in the Bureau of Research and Statistics, the Division of Placement
and Unemployment Insurance of the Department of Labor. We did research
in every aspect of labor, particularly those aspects having to do with
unemployment insurance. My particular function at the time that I was
with that department was to try to study those areas of New York State
where there was a need for particular skills and try to find those areas
where there was a surplus of skills. And we would advertise in the areas
where there was a surplus to try to get people transferred to the areas
where they were needed. We were building, for example, Camp Sampson
in New York State, which has become and still is a very sizable encampment.
And we were expanding others in preparation for possible entrance into
World War II at the time that I got into this activity. So that that
was my major function. It was not the type of studying industrial hiring
as such; it was more for the use of the studies of industrial hiring
to try to place as many people as we could and to try to find those
areas where there were inadequate numbers of people with specific training
so that we could help encourage training in the particular areas where
people were needed.
Sweeney: Now, during World War II you served as a
civilian with the Army Quartermaster Corps. Did this service bring you
to the state of Virginia for the first time, or was it in 1942 that you
came to Norfolk with the Army Engineers to aid in the expediting of shipments
of supplies overseas?
Stern: I can answer that one
rather briefly because of the fact that what happened was that there
was a particular office open in what was called the control section
of the Quartermaster Corps in Baltimore in 1941. When I went down to
work in Baltimore, there were 150 of us working in a room with no partitions.
It's surprising that it worked, but it worked remarkably well under
the civilian leadership of a man by the name of Mr. Marcy. I was working
under a Major Laurie Hess, who turned out to be a very good friend and
with whom I thoroughly enjoyed the privilege
3
of working. We stayed with the Quartermaster
Corps until December of '41, and, as you know, that was the month of
Pearl Harbor. At that time it was decided to shift all construction
to the Engineer Corps, so that for a brief period I was shifted over
with the Engineer Corps in Baltimore, but actually no geographic change.
What happened was that they were dividing up the group, and I was asked
if I would like to come to Norfolk. At that time Norfolk to me was simply
a place on the map, and I knew nothing whatsoever about the city. And
I was told to take my time and decide, that I had an entire hour to
make up my mind. My wife being in New York at the time, I called her
long distance, and she said "Whither thou goest," and we decided
to give it a try, particularly since it was a guarantee of a promotion
in coming down to this place. So that's how I came to be in Norfolk
with the Engineer Corps here where my work did shift. In Baltimore my
work was basically as an expediter in the field of construction of military
camps. At that time there were quite a few military camps being built
in Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia...- Delaware
and Virginia. And that was our function was to see that these camps
were built and that their needs were met. And as in many middle units
between the headquarters in Washington and the field units, we were
pressured on both sides. On one side we helped them get everything that
they needed. And, for example, with the control division it was my function
to see that if a camp needed a particular supply - lumber, we'll say,
for example -that they got it just as quickly as possible. And I remember
one case where I had to track a shipment down and found it had been
shuttled off on a siding in Maryland. So I had to get that back on the
main track and get it to the camp where it was needed. I could tell
you anecdotes about that, but I don't think that's important for us.
Sweeney: Now, maybe you didn't come back to Norfolk,
in a sense, in '45. Well, could you tell me the story of how you came
to teach at the Norfolk Division of William and Mary?
Stern: Yes. During the time that
I was with the Engineer Corps here -I worked from January of '42, when
I came to Norfolk, in the summer of '45 with the U.S. Army Engineer
Corps, and worked in a variety of fields. In fact, my first work was
in the field of auditing, which was a new experience for me. I was also
the
4
insurance - whatever the title is,
I've forgotten long since - but I handled the employers' insurance in
the sense that we would deal with the problem of contractors to make
sure that their insurance coverage was adequate. I also did a great
many inspections in various parts of Virginia and in Elizabeth City,
North Carolina, to see that production was maintained for the European
theater of operations. I became an expediter in that sense, and at one
time I estimated that I had a thousand telephone numbers in my head
that I could dial without even looking. But you must remember that in
those days we had a five- digit, not a seven-digit, operation, or two
letters and five digits, as it later became. I enjoyed the work with
the Army Engineers during the war. I did not particularly look forward
to this as a permanent career. I had never envisioned myself staying
with the military beyond the war as a civilian worker. My love was still
for teaching, and I simply decided, when things looked as if they were
closing up as far as World War II was concerned, that I would come on
up to this campus and see what the possibility was of getting a position.
I didn't even know anything about it other than the fact that this was
a Division of the College of William and Mary and didn't even know at
the time that it was connected to Virginia Polytechnic Institute as
far as some of the programs were concerned, such as business and engineering.
Ultimately it came completely under William and Mary, but for awhile
we were under both. And it was simply the hope of getting a position
where I could get back into teaching, at least to start back into teaching.
Sweeney: Did you meet Lewis Webb at that time?
Stern: Yes, I did. At that time
there were really two men that ran the institution here, Lewis Webb,
who became the President, and Ernest Gray, who was chairman of the faculty.
And Ernest Gray did more of the hiring, but I did meet them both. There
was a very small institution. In fact, the entire faculty and administration
were on just one page of a dittoed sheet at that stage of the game.
And I think there were something like twenty-four of us in the entire
faculty and administration, excluding secretaries, so that it was a
very small operation with just two buildings, really, one which is the
old school that was given over from Larchmont - the original Larchmont
School was condemned in
5
1916, I think, really, or 1919,
I think, really, for the purpose of turning it over to the institution
for extension courses. From 1919 to 1930 these courses were taught here
by people coming down from William and Mary. And it wasn't until 1930
that the institution first had its own faculty. And, of course, Lewis
Webb came in '31 and Eddie White came in '31. And I think Gerald Akers
came in '32 so that these were three of the long-lasting members of
the faculty who came right with the start of it. I didn't come till,
up here, in '45, and it was still a very small institution at that stage
of the game. So that it was an opening that paid $1800 a year, that
is, for the college year, plus $300, which was given by the Governor
to help make it possible to live at that stage of the game. I was making
- and this was the real difficulty in coming back to college teaching
- I was making as much in eight months working for the government as
I was in twelve months here teaching winter and summer.
Sweeney: When he left the service and came back to
Virginia after World War II, Colonel Francis Pickens Miller was deeply
disturbed by the political climate in the state. I was wondering what
your initial reaction was to Virginia politics in 1945?
Stern: I would say that my initial
reaction came in '44 when I had to go down to City Hall three times
in order to get registered to vote. The thing that shocked me so, because
I thought I knew a little bit about political science and government,
was that it was that difficult. I think it was my Yankee accent that
caused them to find excuses to send me away twice before they finally
did register me to vote. But at that time it was a very small registered
vote, and Virginia was such an obvious oligarchy at that stage of the
game that the shock really came from the fact that people seemed to
be that contented with the small voting group in Virginia. And, of course,
this was very different from the politics that I was familiar with in
New York State, and it's one that I never did get used to in Virginia.
But the problem was with the legislature that was rurally controlled,
living in the city of Norfolk, which never went for Byrd in any of these
elections, you felt that you were in sort of a no-man's land, way off
and ignored by the city of Richmond and anything else to do with it
because the cities, by and large, would vote against the Byrd machine
in some elections, but the rural areas would vote six- and eight-to-one
for any Byrd machine candidate. So that the urban areas really had no
say in politics. And I think this was the chief shocker, the inequity
in the situation that existed in '45.
6
Sweeney: You made a speech before the Navy "Y"
on the 26th of November, 1945, in which you attacked racial discrimination.
I was wondering what reaction was to the speech, if there were any, and
also if the college administration reacted at all?
Stern: One of the things about
Lewis Webb was that he personally had no, as far as I could judge, no
racial animosity. Although I didn't get the support I feel I should
have had in efforts to break racial barriers, I didn't get any opposition.
One story I can tell you that is rather interesting was that Lewis Webb
called me into his office one day and said, "I just got an interesting
telephone call, that a neighbor of yours out in Suburban Park called
to say that last night a Negro couple came to your house and that they
were not dressed like servants." In fact, they're people in definite
upper middle class. And the lady, who was Vivian Carter Mason, has since
become somewhat famous in Norfolk and, during the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, served on at least one commission that he named. So that
he was amused and didn't tell me this in any form of criticism. The
college, at that stage of the game, did not take any position, but,
as you may know, I've been active in the American Association to the
United Nations and was for fifteen years on the board of the local chapter
of the American Association to the United Nations. And at one time I
had - well, we modeled a Security Council meeting here. And it was particularly
interesting to me as an item of personal enjoyment that my daughter
represented Great Britain at that meeting and had such a marvelous British
accent for the occasion that some of the students wanted to know whether
she actually was British or not. The reason I mention it was that within
an hour after the meeting, calls came in from the Mayor's office and
from the Governor's office because of the fact that I had invited students
from all of the high schools in the locality, including the black high
schools. I remember, and it was really sad to me, that I had to call
I. C. Norcomb, the teacher in charge of this particular program, three
times before she finally honestly believed that I knew that she was
black and that her students were black and that I really wanted them
to come to the Norfolk Division of the College of William and Mary for
a United Nations model Security Council meeting. But the fact that the
Mayor and the Governor both called to protest that black high school
students met here for this - and I told President Webb, I said, "There's
nothing more ridiculous in my mind than the idea of a United Nations
in which you'd exclude black students from the session." But this
gives you some idea of the atmosphere that operated at that time here.
7
Sweeney: That was the time of Mayor Duckworth?
Stern: That was the time of Mayor
Duckworth.
Sweeney: And was it Governor Battle?
Stern: Let's see whether it was
Tucker or Battle. I'd have to go back over my records, and I remember....
I think... don't really
Sweeney: I was wondering, since you had such an interest
in race relations, if you joined the NAACP or the Human Relations Council,
or just what groups did you join, and what did they do in those years
to improve race relations?
Stern: Well, this is a little
bit general to define. I always thought of my parents as liberal. And,
being in New York State, it wasn't until I came South that I realized
that they were, on that particular subject, at least - my mother was
a good deal more conservative than I. And I refused to recognize racial
barriers on this subject. - as far as the institution was concerned
or in any other way. Now, you refer in one of your questions to the
fact that we conducted a survey - or I conducted it in my sociology
class - on attitudes toward the Negro, and 38 of 53 favored the continuation
of segregation. In an effort to try to deal with this problem, I from
the start out of my teaching here took a class at least once a year
over to Norfolk Division. Now, surprisingly enough, or maybe not surprisingly
because I think you have the imagination to appreciate this, I could
not be the host. I could never invite a sociology class from the Norfolk
Division to come to William and Mary Division here....
Sweeney: This is the Norfolk Division of Virginia
State?
Stern: Norfolk Division of Virginia
State College, right. But Herbert Marshall, who was and is an outstanding
teacher, invited
my classes over at least once a year. Now what we would do would be
discuss a topic that was not a racial topic. We would discuss something
like an agricultural policy of the United States or problems of obtaining
a reasonable wage scale or could Virginia be persuaded to put in the
minimum wage law, which it never has been persuaded to do although every
state around us now has one.
8
But this would be the sort of topic
that we would deal with. But we would go over, and usually it would
be an assembly, but at times we would divide up and have various seminars
operating on different subjects. None of these were designed to attack
race directly. The point was to try to point out to the students by
discussion of other topics how similar our needs, our fears, our hopes,
and so forth, were. And I think it worked out, considering the fear
of the times, quite well. I could spend most of the afternoon on this,
but just to try to condense as much as possible, I worked with a group
including Aubrey Johnson, who's now head of the STOP organization, in
bi-racial housing, at this stage of the game, trying to meet two needs,
particularly to try to get sufficient housing but also to try to upgrade
some of the housing. For example, a house on Church Street, where there
were thirteen people and one bathroom, and most of the time the toilet
was stopped up and unusable. And white people in general in Norfolk
just had no realization of how bad the housing was for the blacks. Fortunately,
a good deal of this was changed with the later 1940's when we started
to come under the housing program which - in the early years, Norfolk
built one unit, one family unit, decent family unit, for every one it
tore down. Unfortunately in recent years it has come far from anywhere
near close to that. But this bi-racial housing group, I think, did have
some effect. It did have the ear of the council although the Mayor was
never sympathetic, Mayor Duckworth. We did, I think, have a mild impact
and did help promote the realization of the needs. And this group continued
into the 1950's and really fell apart because of the strains that came
about in the state with the closing of the schools. As far as the Human
Relations Council is concerned, I was active in that from the time that
it changed from the Women's Council of Interracial Cooperation, which
was formed shortly after World War II, to become the Human Relations
Council. And I was one of the early Presidents of the Human Relations
Council after men did join the group, that is, President of the local
chapter at that stage of the game. I did not and have not joined the
NAACP for political reasons. I never felt that it was politically advantageous
although I believe that it's an organization very worthy of support
and a very conservative organization, as far as that is concerned. But
I just never have personally decided to join.
Sweeney: About the Human Relations Council, could
you describe just what this Human Relations Council did? Were the activities
mainly social or educational?
Stern: They were along similar
lines to the other group that I mentioned. We were interested in housing
- more interested in
9
employment, I would say, than any
other phase. Its educational efforts were incidental. We had a series
of committees that - well, some cases, possibly, more effective in Portsmouth
than we were here in Norfolk in getting things done because we were
the chapter that covered both. The atmosphere was not such that black
voting had any great strength, and one of the very serious efforts was
to get blacks registered and voting with the full realization that until
there was more of a black electorate that nothing else was going to
come about.
Sweeney: Did you engage in any lawsuits or any other
actions to bring about an end to the poll tax?
Stern: Not directly, although
I did support it on the poll tax. I think that we miss a point when
we discuss the poll tax, and that is that the poll tax was not the chief
barrier to black voting. And we should remember, in the first place,
that at the height of the poll tax there were about six million whites
disenfranchised by the poll tax and only four million blacks, although
the word "only" is a misnomer in that sense. But, although
a much higher percentage of blacks, numerically it was not quite as
large as the number of whites. What really prevented the vote from becoming
larger was the registration system. Registration in Virginia was extremely
difficult. And the effort was made to make it impossible for the blacks.
I don't know whether you've run into the blank sheet registration, but
this was one of the devices that was used for a time to try to keep
blacks from registering on the grounds that the Constitution said that
a person must register without any aid, memorandum, or any other assistance.
Well, this was not intended any time, in any way, shape or manner to
mean that a person had to fill out a blank sheet, memorize everything
on it and get down and fill out everything on it. This was absolutely
ridiculous and didn't last too long, but it's indicative of the type
of attitude of the time. The misfortune was that people put too much
emphasis upon the poll tax. The real thing was the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, which took away the literacy test and virtually guaranteed
the right to register and vote. And I think this was - if you look at
the figures - although it only increased black registration in Virginia
23%, you might take a look at the first year under the Voting Rights
Act. The number in Mississippi increased 491%; that's quite a jump.
10
Sweeney: Do you feel that the influence of the Navy
made Norfolk a more liberal place politically than, say, Richmond or Lynchburg?
Stern: I don't think there's
any great doubt about that. For example, when the schools were closed
in Norfolk, a good deal of the help in getting the schools open came
from the Navy in every way, shape, and form. I don't think we would
have been nearly as successful in setting the atmosphere. Admittedly,
it was court cases that we financed that actually opened the schools.
But we must also remember that the schools were opened in an atmosphere
that was very helpful to make integration successful in Norfolk. And
this would not have been true if it hadn't been for the Navy's support.
The Navy really threatened to just go ahead and open its complete school
system on the Naval Base if the schools weren't opened. And that was
a tremendous help to us.
Sweeney: You have answered very well this question
about the students' attitudes, but just this last point here. When did
you notice that the students in your classes were becoming more liberal
in their racial views? Was it not until the 1960's, perhaps?
Stern: I would answer this way.
We'll talk about this more, I guess, a little later. When the schools
were closed, I think this shocked the Norfolk students. I think it changed
a lot more attitudes. I think it also helped bring about the end of
the Byrd machine. I think all of these factors came out of that. So
that I would say the period of the '50's was more or less a waiting
period. And then, when the schools in Norfolk were closed, I think that
this really changed so many fundamental attitudes in Norfolk that it
would have been impossible to go back to the attitudes that were here
before. And it was this school closing, you know, that elected Henry
Howell to the General Assembly for the first time, when he ran on the
open school principle in the election of '59. So that this is, I think,
what made the students more liberal. I did persuade a friend of mine
to become the first graduate, black student, to register in the college.
And one member of the administration called me and asked me if I was
trying to bust up the whole school, that did I realize how many people
would walk out as a result of this? And I said, "Yes, I realize
how many people will walk out as a result of this - none." He said
I didn't know what I was talking about. This friend of mine,
11
Dr. G. W. C. Brown, who is since
deceased, had done graduate work at Columbia and was a marvelous individual,
and the first night of class sat off by himself, and then the next time
at class students joined him in this graduate class, and from then on
never sat by himself. And my figure was correct - nobody withdrew as
a result of this. But administrations are much more easily shocked,
I think, than faculties.
Sweeney: The first campaign against the Byrd organization
that occurred after you joined the faculty was 1946 when Martin Hutchinson
ran with very slim resources against Harry Byrd, Sr., for the U. S. Senate.
Did you work for Martin Hutchinson in that campaign?
Stern: No, I really did not.
I think, like a lot of people, I wasn't very impressed with Martin Hutchinson;
I think that was part of the difficulty. The other was the realization
that there was practically no chance of getting very far in it. I can't
say beyond that because the memory of detail of eighteen years ago would
be difficult to bring to mind at the moment. In fact, I just don't remember
the campaign that well except for the man's name and the later experience
when he was nominated for a federal position and Harry Byrd very neatly
sabotaged that effort.. But I was not that interested in practical politics
at that stage of the game and was teaching a fairly heavy load so that
I really didn't have that much time for politics.
Sweeney: In that year too you were made the administrator
of the evening college. So could you describe the kind of students that
you were getting in the evening college, and were they mostly veterans
of very serious purpose of getting through and getting their diploma?
Stern: Yes, they were, both the
day and evening college. My first year here was 1945-46, and it was
rather a shocker because the first semester I taught eight students,
and the second semester, with the veterans coming back, I had sixty-four
in the section. I think I had something like twelve or thirteen in comparative
government the first semester, and fifty-five the second. So that the
impact of the veterans upon the college would be almost impossible to
measure. We were simply swamped in the second half of '46 with the veterans
coming back from World War II. And I think that all of us thought that
12
we had never had a group of students
that could come close to the group that came right out of World War
II as veterans. We were given instructions at the start of the semester
as to what was to be covered that semester, including term papers and
when they were due, and that was the end of it. You didn't ever have
to remind anybody; they were done, and they were handed in. You never
had to pressure; you didn't have to remind them of the standards that
you believed should be met in your courses. They met the standards in
your courses. So that this was, you might say, the golden age of college
teaching because they were anxious to get - not just to get on and to
get to work - they were anxious to get an education in the very real
sense of an education. It was almost like a sponge, just absorbing as
fast as you could give it out. And the questions were very superior
and mature type of questions and showed a good deal of reasoning behind
the points that they brought up. So that we would have students that
came to us in both the day and evening college who were not only older
chronologically but they had been through one of the worst experiences
that people could imagine at that stage, and they were people who believed
that education was important not just for getting ahead, but they felt
that they were a part of American civilization, and they wanted to be
an informed part of American civilization. So that we just have never
had students come close to that group. I'm glad you asked the question.
Sweeney: How about the one thing that impressed me
was that in those years you taught a wide variety of subjects -sociology,
comparative government, and others that I found mentioned in the newspaper.
Did this put a strain on you, trying to prepare? And how many hours did
you teach?
Stern: Well, this will probably
surprise you, but when I first came to the Norfolk Division, our standard
teaching load was thirty-three hours, eighteen one semester and fifteen
the other. So you can see, with the low pay that we had, they expected
an awful lot of return. The situation has improved immeasurably since
that date. But you're right as to the variety of courses that I taught.
I taught a course in European history,
13
taught a year's course in European,
a year's course in American history, I taught a course in sociology
principles first semester and problems the second semester, and I taught
a course in American government, a course in comparative government,
and just to keep my hand in, I made up my own course on American democracy,
which I taught at the same time. So that it is true. I was given sociology
on the ground that whoever was the bottom man on the totem pole, that
is, whoever came in the last member of the faculty to join would get
the sociology. And I actually enjoyed it so much that I kept on with
it for years after I could have given it up. I mention the question
of economics. I think maybe I should mention also that our pay was so
low that during the summer I did not work for the college. What I would
do in the summer in order to be able to live during the winter would
be to go back down to the Army Corps of Engineers, which I did until
'52. The first couple of years was to handle essentially contracts that
I'd been dealing with during the time that I was full time employed
there, and could handle these for the Army Engineers. But the last summer
of '52 I was working on Kerr Dam, which is up in the middle of the state
west of here. And I still remember the time that I was trying to write
a report, and the temperature was so hot - it was something like 107
degrees - no air conditioning at that stage -that the sweat poured off
my arm in such a way that it was impossible to read what I had written.
I finally had to give up any attempt to even write anything on the page
that particular day. But I did enjoy that work with the Army Engineers
and was glad that I had that work. If I hadn't, I don't know that I
could have been able to afford it to teach.
Sweeney: In 1948 you taught a course in municipal
administration for members of the Norfolk city government designed to
provide an overall view of the problems of city government. It emphasized
budget, organization and personnel problems. Could you describe your experiences
in this course, and how successful do you think it was?
Stern: Well, it was successful
enough that Portsmouth invited me to repeat the course on the strength
of that experience. Norfolk at that time had one of the greatest city
managers that the United States has ever had. C. A. Harold was the
14
city manager of Norfolk, and C.
A. Harold was very much the professional individual. And he designed
this course in cooperation with me for the purpose of trying to tell
the people who head the departments - those were the people who were
in the course - what was going on in the other departments and to also
get an overall view of the city. This is why such things as budget and
other factors, organization and personnel, the type problem that all
of the departments could share, were emphasized. Planning was another
one that was emphasized for that same reason. And the whole idea of
it was to give these people a professional attitude toward the entire
city, not just toward their department. It was to try to broaden their
view because these people didn't have time to take a course in city
government. And really there was no need for them to. They knew city
government generally, but they did not know how their department fitted
in with the other departments in the city, and this was an opportunity
to give that overview. And I think it was successful in making the department
heads into a team for C. A. Harold, and I think it was equally as successful
under Mr. Owens in Portsmouth in serving his purposes.
Sweeney: Just a slight additional question on that.
Did any member of the Norfolk city council ever come in to take the course?
Stern: No, the course was well
publicized, and they would have been more than - I think everybody in
there would have been very happy to have seen them, but none of them
ever did show up. In fact, no one ever did show up except the members
of the city council, and once or twice C. A. Harold came in, and Mr.
Owens came in once or twice in Portsmouth. But it was really a terrific
experience as far as I was concerned because the department heads who
were people of very deep interest and abiding interest - and they were
anxious to contribute, so it made a very fine seminar. And their contributions
were at least as important as mine.
Sweeney: I notice in the press at this time that you
were described as the head of the history department. Was this an accurate
title?
15
Stern: No, at that time it was
social studies that we had, a division of social studies in the college.
So that, if my memory serves me right there, the history department
came later. And I think Stan Pliska was the first one to head it up,
and then Bill Spencer came in. But that, I believe, was the first time
we ever had a history department, not under me; I was never a historian.
Sweeney: In the late 1940's you were obviously very
much interested in the movement toward world federation. What role did
you foresee the United Nations playing in this? Did you notice that, as
the fifties went on and even the late forties, that the ideal of world
federation slipped away as the Cold War intensified?
Stern: Yes. You've reminded me;
this is another organization I was president of at one stage, was the
Norfolk chapter of United World Federalists. We didn't have any voice
like Norman Cousins in Virginia. Fortunately for us, the Reverend Dr.
Chamberlain in Richmond gave us the facilities of his church at 1201
West Franklin Street in Richmond to use in the early years, and without
that we never would have been able to get as far as we did. You're absolutely
correct. The group did divide rather interestingly between those who
thought that world federation had to operate independently of the United
Nations and those who thought it would work with, concurrently with,
the United Nations. After pondering this problem for awhile, I came
to the conclusion that the only way that we were going to make progress
was through the United Nations. And I still think that that's probably
the truth of the matter, although the United World Federalists, to which
I still belong, is an organization which believes that the United Nations
has to be strengthened a great deal before it can be called anything
of the nature of a real federation or a government. The chapter in Norfolk
disappeared during a later presidency simply because of the pressures
of the Cold War and the distrust between East and West and the fact
that it would make no sense to try to have a world federation without
the Soviet Union. And the distrust for the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain
speech of Churchill was one of the factors that, I think, threw a good
deal of cold water on the hopes of the United World Federalists. And
virtually all of us shifted over to working with the United Nations
and, as I mentioned, I was on that board for about fifteen years
16
before I left it and was at one
time chairman of the U.N. chapter and very active. Which brings to mind
one of the bitterest stories of my experience. When I was vice chairman
of the group, I persuaded the board to invite Eleanor Roosevelt to come
down to Norfolk in the 1950's and, at the next board meeting, it caused
such a violent split and threatened to end the chapter that I had the
very unhappy experience of having to write her and tell her that the
climate in Norfolk was such in the latter 1950's that I had to dis-invite
her. Well, it so happened that a few years later the climate had improved
tremendously, and I was very happily able to invite her back, and she
did return and spoke both at the college and that night at the Center,
what is the Center Theater and Center Auditorium. And she packed the
place, filling every seat in the house. So that's, I guess, my most
embarrassing moment.
Sweeney: In 1949 Francis Pickens Miller mounted the
strongest challenge to date against the Byrd machine. I understand that
you participated to some extent in his campaign, and I'd like to know
more about your participation and also if you could make an assessment
of the significance of his candidacy?
Stern: Well, your estimate is
correct. This is what actually brought me into practical politics, when
Francis Pickens Miller declared for the governorship. The opportunity
looked too good. It so happened that Battle, a very respected and able
individual, was selected by the Byrd machine as its candidate. And two
other candidates came along. So there were actually four candidates
running in the 1949 election. And it really looked like an opportunity
to overturn the Byrd machine. It was the first time that I met Henry
Howell was when working on that. I don't know that I can say I made
any significant contributions in the '49 campaign other than just the
type of grassroots effort of going around, trying to get support from
people in Norfolk. But it was my introduction into practical Virginia
politics and I felt that this was fighting for one of the most worthwhile
candidates who ever came forth in Virginia politics in its history.
I don't agree with you on the statement that this was the closest there
since we've had a couple of Republican Governors and came much closer
to having Henry Howell....
Sweeney: Up until that time.
17
Stern: Up until that time, yes.
Up until that time the anti- Byrd machine efforts had been so scattered
and ineffective that they were meaningless. But a lot of people believed
that Francis Pickens Miller could change the state around, and I still
think it would have made a tremendous impact if he'd been elected. On
the other hand, many of us did not feel that disappointed at the loss
because we felt that the tide was going so strongly that in the next
election there would be a very good chance for an anti- Byrd Democrat
to get the governorship. It shows how innocent we were because in '53
the Byrd machine put up the weakest gubernatorial candidate that they
put up in the more than twenty years that I've been in Virginia, and
the anti-Byrd group wasn't even able to marshall an opposing candidate
to fight Stanley. . . . Whitehead obviously - I shouldn't say obviously
- but Robert Coles Whitehead was the greatest member of the Virginia
legislature at that time. He was voted by his co-workers in the General
Assembly as the most outstanding. He believed that it was ridiculous
to go into the campaign unless he had an adequate financial pledge.
And most people felt that if you were going into a campaign you went
into it, and then the pledge of money would come. But Whitehead, I think,
made a mistake, and I think that it was a very unfortunate mistake because
I think that, if he'd gone in, I think he would have won the nomination
for the Democratic party, and the election, of course, he would have
gotten hands down. But I can understand the man's frustration in feeling
that he didn't want to do like Martin Hutchinson had done in '46. But
I think that Whitehead was a very different individual. I think the
man was certainly one of the greatest members of the legislature that
I have ever known. I can tell you a story that Whitehead told me one
time that, as far as I know, I've never seen it in print and never heard
it any place other than Whitehead's telling me this story. He was saying
that in some time after - let's see, when was the first time that Almond.
. . when did Almond get the governorship.., what was the year on that?
Sweeney: It was 1957...
Stern: Fifty-seven, yes. All
right. Well, in '53 Almond had gone around the state and made an
effort to get the nomination for himself. And when this word reached
Byrd, Byrd was furious that anybody should try to get the nomination
other than by waiting his turn. So that when the group sat
18
around the table, there was usually
about anywhere from seven to nine, sat around the table at the Senator's
office in Washington and decided whose turn it was to run for Governor
for the Democratic party, and, as Whitehead told the story, Byrd turned
to Almond and said, "Lindsay, I didn't like your going around the
state trying to get the nomination for yourself, and let me tell you
this. If you try this again, you not only won't run for Governor, you
won't even be in this group that decides who's going to run for Governor."
Sweeney: In this period did you teach any extension
courses for this college or for any other college?
Stern: I may have. You just hit
a part of my memory that just draws a complete blank as far as I'm concerned.
I'm sure I did there; I think I taught one course for U.Va., but I just
couldn't pin down the date as to when it was that I taught that course
for U.Va. in extension down here. That was a long time back.
Sweeney: In 1950 you conceived of an informal television
discussion by faculty members about world affairs. This program finally
became a reality in 1953 and was called "Global Trouble Spots."
I wanted to know if you remembered any thing about that - who participated
in it and how long it lasted?
Stern: Yes, I think that this
is more fun than almost anything that I ever did as a faculty member.
Stanley Pliska, who is in charge of the - is it evening extension program
now?...
Sweeney: General studies.
Stern: General studies. I'm sorry;
that's right. At one time he was in charge of the evening program, which
he took over from Bob McClellan, but he's now general studies dean.
And a fellow by the name of Bill Whitehurst and Admiral Wright of the
history department, who later did administrative work - the four of
us would meet once a week. We would do some rehearsing and outline what
we would talk about. And I think our full title was "Trouble Spots
around the Globe," but "Global Trouble Spots" sounds
a little bit more professional. I have the marquee from WTAR from the
time that they put us out there to announce our program there one time,
considering it that important. Boyd Harrier, who just died this past
month, who for many years was connected with WHRO, was the producer
of the program. And we thought it was professional. Unfortunately,
19
it would have cost too much at that
stage to have put it on film. Today it could be done for much less.
But I think if we had put it on film, it probably could have been sold
because it attracted a fairly good audience, from what I've heard from
the station at the time. And it was done entirely without script. We
would outline the program and make sure that at least one of the four
of us - we would change the victim each week - would take the unpopular
side of whatever discussion was coming up, and then we would go at it.
And at that stage, you remember, Britain was withdrawing from the Suez
Canal, and we would announce each week the following week would be Egypt.
I say "each week" because for three weeks in a row we announced
Egypt as the next trouble spot, and something came into the news that
carried much more weight. So that it was a month before Egypt actually
got into it. But this went on for about a year. It was pretty close
to a year between the time we started it and ended it. We did make a
sort of half-hearted effort to try to sell it to some of the people
downtown, but there were just no takers because, as I say, we just didn't
have any scripts that we could show them because there never was a script
for the show. And we didn't have any film clips, because I really think
if we could have gotten a few people in there that watched it of that
group that it was a salable item. Because the repartee went just like
that. It was constantly going back and forth, and it was, I think, quite
professional in the way in which it was handled, considering it operated
without any script.
Sweeney: In 1949 you devised a new method of freshman
orientation at the YMCA camp facility near Lynnhaven. This was a new approach
to take the freshmen out of the academic environment, take them to a place
where they could be together for three days, and I wondered how you came
up with this idea, what you thought this camp would accomplish, how it
would benefit the student?
Stern: Well, I think it's the
best answer to apathy I've ever heard of. Actually, I ran two camps.
We ran one from Monday to Wednesday noon and the second from Wednesday
noon to Friday evening. And I can tell you I was pretty much dead at
the end of it. Ed Kovner, who's in the engineering school, came back
one day with a crutch because of the fact that he'd been stepped on
by one of the students in playing, I think it was, a basketball game.
But we were all - we all got out and pitched in. It was
20
a very fine place to get students
away from the city. The girls' camp was used for the girls. . . (end
of tape)
Sweeney: I wondered how successful it was. You were
talking about the new atmosphere on campus, or different atmosphere, when
you came back.
Stern: Yes, I would say that
the students were very much alive. They were alert. They were interested
in their classes. They felt that they knew something about how to study,
and I think more freshmen are overwhelmed by the feeling that they don't
know how to study because there is that much difference between high
school and college that, when you enter college, you have to be able
to be your own director. If you can't direct yourself, you're going
to get lost very quickly at college. And, I think that this is what
students really needed. And I think they got some of this from the camp.
I think they felt being a part of the institution. Now, one of the difficulties
that this college has faced all through its history has been the fact
that students come in here in the fall just as if they were going to
a post-graduate program in high school rather than really coming to
an institution of higher education in the sense of what a college campus
ought to be. And they come in here and take courses and then go on home
and have no real feeling of being part of an institution. And I think
that - although you must remember that we had a much smaller campus
in 1949 than we do today, still, I think that the principle is so valuable
that I was very disappointed when, after a couple of years, the college
gave it up. I was hoping they would have continued it. I can tell you
one other thing while we're talking and, I guess, in a sense, really
reminiscing over what's happened here in a quarter century - over a
quarter century - of this campus. Well, one of the most interesting
experiences I had was at a college meeting - faculty meeting - when
the faculty voted the honor system out. And I was so blooming mad, I
got up there and I guess I harangued, if that's the proper word for
it, and really told them. I said, my belief, a college that doesn't
prepare students for honor doesn't prepare them for anything. And that
this is one of the things that certainly ought to be done at this institution.
And that if we couldn't prepare the students this way, I think that
the whole concept of college is a failure. I've often stated my own
beliefs that we prepare our students, if we prepare them right, as much
for the eight hours that they're awake outside of their working hours
as we do for the eight
21
hours that they work, perhaps even
more so, if we are going to have citizens who are going to make a worthwhile
contribution to democracy. But to get back to the point. I really think
I was as mad as I've been almost any time in my life at this faculty
for doing that. And apparently I was successful because of the fact
that I was asked by the faculty members in the group if I would assume
responsibility for the Honor Council. I said, "Absolutely."
And I did. So that I became chairman - at that time you could only be
chairman two years in a row and then it was off; I don't know what the
rule is today. So for the next two years I was chairman of the Honor
Council. Let me explain that one of my objections to the whole honor
system that operates at this institution and always has operated except
for the time that I was running it, is that people come in and they
sign a card saying that "I understand the honor system and promise
to abide by it" and sign their name and hand it in. Well, they
don't understand it; they don't know anything about it. How in the world
can you expect people to respect an honor system when you start out
with a lie? So that during the two years that I ran that system we took
the freshman English classes, and every freshman English class devoted
at least some time. And every member of the Honor Council did this and
took a certain number of sections. We divided it up about as evenly
as we could. And they went to those sections, explained it, and then
we gave them a test the following period. And if they did not understand
the honor system well enough to pass that test, they couldn't sign the
card. And they never did get to sign the card until they took the test
and that test was ultimately given to every one of those freshmen, so
that by the time they signed that card they knew what they were signing.
And this is to me a very important point about an institution. I've
always resented the idea that we give people a card to sign something
which violates the whole principle of the honor system before they even
get started on it.
Sweeney: You met Henry Howell in 1949, you said. I'd
be interested in hearing about your first meeting with him and just generally
the whole course of your association with him down through the years -
his '53 run for the House of Delegates, which was unsuccessful, and then
his successful run in '59, and then his other campaigns for Governor and
Lieutenant Governor.
22
Stern: Okay! That's really a
large order because I've considered Henry Howell a friend in every way
and not just politically. And I do consider him one of the most valuable
people, if not the most valuable person, in the state. And Henry Howell
came into the election of '49 and headed up the effort for Francis Pickens
Miller in Norfolk. I worked with him, and it was a real pleasure. I
might mention one of the rather interesting experiences in that campaign.
It's also the time when the Campbell amendments were voted, which would
have eliminated the poll tax but at the expense of giving the state
legislature complete control over the requirements for voting. And we
felt that this was too broad. And Henry and I were working the polls
at Granby High School when Senator Breeden came to vote. And I guess
you might say in stereophonic fashion we talked to him on the Campbell
amendments and why we were against it as giving too much power to the
legislature. He said, "You've convinced me," and as far as
I know - he said he would - he went in and voted against the very amendment
that he'd been voting for in Richmond. But Henry has always been a persuasive
individual. I didn't have anything to do with his '53 campaign; I couldn't
for the life of me tell you why at this point. I don't think that we
really got back together again between '49 very much, except very incidentally
in the '52 election, which was a very sad election, when Francis Pickens
Miller took on Senator Byrd and was defeated very badly. But we didn't
have that much political connection between then and the school closing.
The school closing was Henry's idea of something that ought to be met
head on. And he was the only candidate who actually ever met with the
Norfolk Committee for the Public Schools during the time of that campaign.
On election day in '59 I provided all of the observers at all of the
polls - I don't know whether we had fifty-three then or fifty-one or
how many it was - but the ones that were provided for Henry Howell and
the ones that were provided for Senator Breeden, who was at that time
under quite a challenge. I got them together from the people who were
supporting the Committee for the Public Schools. And, of course, we
were exceedingly happy to see Senator Breeden back in the Senate and
to see Henry Howell and Calvin Childress, who ran as a team, get into
the House. One of the interesting events in that campaign was that one
of those running for the House was challenged by Henry Howell as having
supported - been a supporter of the John Birch Society. The man made
the mistake of saying
23
that that was not true, at which
point Henry Howell produced the documentation to back up his statement,
and I think that, as much as anything else, helped him to win the election
campaign. It was rather fascinating to me, when we were counting the
ballots after the election - because at that time I was a chief judge
in the precinct in the Old Academic Building -that there were people
who voted for Henry Howell and some of the most conservative people
who were all for closing the schools - at the same time. And you can't
tell them, the machine voting today, on how people split their ballots.
But some of the ballots made little or no sense. People canceled their
own votes out because they just didn't understand who was running on
what platform at the time. But this was the start of Henry Howell's
rise. He did challenge Billy Prieur, getting Calvin Childress to run
for the clerk of court, and almost beat Billy Prieur. And, when you
consider the fact that Billy Prieur had been running this city, and
from 1950 to 1962 every member of the city council was selected by Billy
Prieur. Nobody came on the city council in that twelve-year period who
did not come on before the election. So that when Billy Prieur decided
it was time for a change, he would persuade whomever he thought to go
off to go off and then the council would get together and nominate his
candidate. One of the fascinating stories about the time when the schools
were closed and we brought the case before Judge Hoffman in federal
court - we had to bring it in both federal and state court at the same
time - and we brought it before Judge Hoffman. Judge Hoffman was asking
Mayor Duckworth about a certain meeting, and Mayor Duckworth gave a
list of the names of the people who were at the meeting. And they were
the members of the city council and the members of the school board.
And then he said, "Mr. William L. Prieur, Jr." And Judge Hoffman
said, "Well, I'm afraid I don't understand. Mr. Prieur is clerk
of the court. Now could you tell me why the clerk of the court would
be attending a meeting of the city council and the school board?"
Well, if you've ever heard anybody try to lead an answer off into the
woods and get it lost as fast as possible and unable, completely unable,
to lose it, it was Mayor Duckworth because of the fact that everybody
knew in the entire audience, including the man on the bench, that the
reason that Billy Prieur
24
was there was because he was the
boss of the Democratic Party of Norfolk and the representative of the
Byrd machine in Norfolk. But you can't say that in federal court! So
he was really hoisted with his own petard and it was an amazing experience
to watch that particular incident. It was one of the few moments of
joy that we had during that period. Let me mention one more thing about
the school closing, not just because it launched Henry Howell but because
of the fact that this was rather indicative of the mood of the city
and how the city council could react in a juvenile fashion - almost
scared many of us - well, I don't know, you provide the descriptive
words. But the city council was ready to vote, at one stage, to actually
close the black high school. Now, if this had been done - they did vote
it, they did vote it; in fact, Roy Martin was the only one who voted
against it. But this was in '58. We had at that time I don't know how
many thousand white students on the street because of the closing of
the schools. We set up all these separate schools all over Norfolk,
but the white schools were closed because of the state law. If we had
closed the black school, you can imagine what life could possibly have
been like in this city with all these youngsters with nothing to do
at that age, with the situation highly inflammatory; it could have been
one of the worst situations in the world. Well, fortunately, we got
an immediate injunction from Judge Hoffman to stop that nonsense, and
the school stayed open. But it does give you something of the mood of
the time. But back to Henry Howell because Henry is an outstanding person.
I think he's one of the most sincere and dedicated people I've known.
I've been over to Henry Howell's house I don't know how many times through
the years, and we've sat in his back room at night sometimes reminiscing,
sometimes planning, sometimes going over names of individuals for various
things and other times trying to decide what approach to use in a campaign
or whatever it was that was up at the moment. But I think that Henry
has an unusual ability to get loyalty out of people almost unmatched,
and the answer is that he gives it. The man has that type of loyalty
personally, and he is an individual who is so quick, so understanding
to grasp the heart of the problem that you're discussing so quickly
that many people just can't keep up with him. In fact, most of us can't
keep up with him, to be perfectly
25
honest about it.
But he has never, as far as I know, used his efforts for any mean purpose.
And I think that this is one of the things that gives the man the strength
that he has. I think that he really is for the people in a sense that
very few of us understand. I've been in an audience, for example, in
Ocean View when, during the course of three-quarters of an hour, he
would call upon the names of just about half the people in that audience
and speak to them and mention some incident. That's one part of it.
The other part of it would be for you to ask him or for any of us to
look over the mail that the man receives of people from all over Virginia
who call upon him for help because the state has failed to come through
on something. And it's amazing the high batting average that that man
has in getting assistance for people from various state agencies that
have already told the person they couldn't do anything for them or getting
insurance companies or in dealing with problems of Vepco or C &
P Telephone Company or almost anything, including a person who has gotten
into an accident and called upon him to help them out. And the man does
it constantly; he seems to be almost completely tireless in his determination
to try to help individuals when they are in need. And this is one of
the reasons why he was able to build up one of the most incredible personal
supports that any politician has ever gotten in Virginia.
Sweeney: Do you think he's changed Virginia politics?
Stern: Without the shadow of
a doubt. It would take a long time to analyze the downfall of the Byrd
machine. I think it started in '57; I believe that's the year when Coombs
died, who was the man who controlled the pay by the Byrd machine through
the various - compensation board to the various judges, attorneys general,
and so forth around the state. I don't think that Byrd was ever able
to find anybody as good, as strong. But I think that the school closing
hurt Byrd tremendously, the fact that he had to split with his own Governor
on this situation. If Governor Almond hadn't taken that position, I
think we would have lost business in the state, and I think our economy
would have stagnated for a long time. So that I think that Almond took
the right position. But the Byrd machine was on the decline from that
point on.
26
And in '66, when Harry Byrd, Sr.,
became so ill, we almost saw the end of it in more ways than one because
Harry Byrd, Jr., only very narrowly retained his seat in that election.
And as we know, it was a one-party state at that stage and has become
a two-party state over the years since then - at least at the top element
even if it isn't really a two-party state in the legislature at this
point. So that when you say, "How has Henry Howell changed politics
in Virginia?" Well, Henry Howell did fight the poll tax, did take
the case up to the Supreme Court. Henry Howell did fight Vepco and has
given the people the feeling that here is a person who is willing to
fight with the State Corporation Commission to make sure that the people
get a decent break on their rates from the utilities. And I don't think
there's any doubt whatsoever but that the change of the membership on
the State Corporation Commission to the type of individuals who are
on there now from the group that was there before is due in very great
part to the fact that it has now become politically fashionable to see
that the consumer gets a better break in politics than he ever got before
and which he never would have had without Henry Howell. The man has
seen to it that the fight for automobile insurance rates has been conducted
adequately to protect the people, and I think that he's done a fine
job in helping to make this concept popular in Virginia. So that I think
within the course of not too long a time we'll have no-fault insurance
in Virginia. What type of no-fault is another question entirely, but
the fact is that Henry Howell is the one who has made all this possible.
And I think that the remarkable thing is that the entire statewide machine
has been so much of a personal machine rather than a political party
machine, has been one of the remarkable things that we've seen in Virginia
politics. Now you can say the Byrd machine was also a personal machine
because Byrd came in despite Bishop Cannon's efforts to keep him out
of the governorship, and Byrd changed the state tremendously - gave
us a new Constitution. But I think that the atmosphere that Henry Howell
has created is going to be a more enduring one because I think he has
made it possible for people to realize that the individual can play
a part in Virginia politics and
27
mean something. And he was lucky
in the sense that he came along at the time of the Voting Rights Act,
which made it possible to get a large registration drive. I remember
one drive we put in and got, with the aid of several college students
coming here from various parts of the country, two thousand people registered
in the course of five days. That's the sort of politics that Henry Howell
has always stood for, and I think that this is one of the reasons why
the man is going to be an influence in Virginia politics for a long
time to come, regardless of who's Governor, regardless of who the Senators
are.
Sweeney: In 1969 when he ran for the governorship,
were you on his board of strategy? Did you function on a kind of board
of strategy in '73 also?
Stern: Let me go back a ways
here because we've omitted something that's very important to understand
what went on. During the 1960's what happened in Norfolk politics, I've
mentioned just the case where Henry Howell persuaded Calvin Childress
to run for clerk of court and came within an ace of winning it from
Billy Prieur. We tried several times to work out those various - well,
let me start that one over. During the 1960's we had one organization,
for example, CDG, Committee for Democratic Government, which was designed
to provide some principles and a very simple statement of policy that
was to direct and change Norfolk's future. We tried a bi-racial campaign
in '67 and came within an ace of having a black candidate nominated
at that stage, if my dates are correct. This is for the state legislature.
But Henry Howell was behind all of these, and it was usually he who
suggested, made the suggestions or called us together and the suggestion
came up. I don't know that Henry Howell could ever be said, until this
campaign, when he really did try to formalize it, that he had a single
strategy committee. If so, I wasn't on it, to be perfectly honest about
it. We consulted in every one of these campaigns, and I did make suggestions,
I guess in almost every one of his campaigns, as to things I thought
should be done. But meetings in his back room, for example, would very
often be just four, five, six, or seven of us at the most and I think
Henry Howell would usually come out of those
28
meetings with at least twice as
many suggestions as we made because his imagination and fertile brain
was always ahead of just about everybody else's in the group. But there
was a group there, and I'll try to think back of who the people were
who really did a good deal of the planning of the strategy, and I would
say probably Stanley Sacks was as much a leader in that group as any
one individual, but I think if I go back over, my list, I probably have
some record somewhere of the people who really helped him from the Norfolk
end in the various campaigns, right through the sixties, including the
gubernatorial. One service that I rendered in that campaign was to write
a letter off, actually with friends, including Dr. Leland Peterson,
who did most of the drafting of the letter, to ... At that time we wrote
a letter to Governor Godwin, in the '69 campaign, to protest the fact
that, at the time of the primary, he refused to say that if Henry Howell
were nominated by the Democratic Party that he would support him. As
the Governor and nominal head of the Democratic Party, we thought he
should assume the same obligation that all of the others of us assumed
and that was that we would support whoever was nominated. And particularly
was this difficult for us to understand in Norfolk because so many times
we had been in favor of a liberal candidate going back to 1949 when
Francis Pickens Miller - and seen that candidate defeated by the Byrd
machine and we'd been loyal to them in the general elections. So that
Godwin's new definition of loyalty, I think, was one of the factors
that hurt Battle and actually cost him the campaign. And the best example
of that was the time that - when the unity dinner was held in Richmond
and Pollard, who had been knocked out of the campaign in the first round,
was one of those who was on the platform for that dinner but that Henry
Howell was in the audience because Godwin refused to have him up on
the platform is an excellent example of the type of way in which Godwin
actually did more harm to the Democratic Party while he was in it than
he did to the Democratic Party after he was out of it, even if he did
win the governorship this time.
Sweeney: You became active in two organizations, the
American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties
Union. How strong was the chapter of the AAUP on the Norfolk campus in
the 1950's. And what function did you perform in the chapter?
29
Stern: It looks like you're trying
to get a list of all the organizations - I think you've done it, too
- of all the organizations that I was president of, because I was president
in the 1950's of the American Association of University Professors and,
after the American Civil Liberties Union finally developed a Norfolk
chapter, I was the second chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union.
On the AAUP, when I first came on campus, virtually every member of
the faculty was a member of the AAUP. Now it was a very small faculty
group, but there was a good deal of cohesion, and we worked together,
and it was so strongly united that presidents of other colleges couldn't
understand how if any violation were made to any AAUP principle that
every member of the chapter, which included practically the entire faculty,
would protest. So that I would say we've never been as strong as we
were in the 1940's and early '50's. Unfortunately, as the fifties went
on, interest sort of waned because of no problem. ... (End of tape).
Okay, we were talking about the American Association of University Professors
chapter and the strength of it in the 1940's. And during the fifties,
as the college enlarged, the cohesion dropped, and the result was that
participation became much less active than it had been in the forties.
I was president during the fifties, and Herb Sebren followed me as president,
and I don't know exactly what year, but it was not too long after that
that the chapter just became moribund for awhile and really did not
get active again until the 1960's. So that I would say that Dorothy
Johnson was probably the member of the faculty that was most instrumental
in helping us get back on its feet. Olsen was here in the history department,
and he was head of the chapter and was president elect, but at that
time he'd gone up to Northern Virginia, and when he came back here the
college would not give him the advance in salary which he thought his
work merited. He had been given the North Carolina award for the outstanding
contribution to any periodical for an article he wrote for them - and
he left. So that that lost us our first potential president of the state
AAUP. But it did grow in strength, and Dr. Johnson made an outstanding
president, and she later became state president, and then a member of
the national council, so she has done more in the AAUP than any other
individual has done at Old Dominion University.
30
Sweeney: Do you think that the faculty members ever
got any positive gains out of the AAUP in salary or reformed tenure procedures
or anything?
Stern: Well, on the question
of what actual benefits we performed, these are always difficult to
judge. For one thing, you know no administrator's ever going to come
up to you and say, "You've done such a good job, we're going to
increase the salaries because of it." But I have no doubt about
the fact that the work of the AAUP on campus has been instrumental in
protecting many people. Without going into individual cases, which I
don't think is particularly desirable, there have been individuals who
are on campus today who would not be on campus in 1974 if it were not
for the work that the AAUP had done. So that I think we have been helpful.
I think it's also true that the AAUP, being a national organization
and providing appeal up to the national and the fact that no college
enjoys being on the list of condemned institutions, is a factor that
does protect tenure. I feel that one place where we have been weak and
which to me is not justifiable is the fact that you have to sign with
your contract that you will accept the provisions of the faculty handbook.
That faculty handbook is not written by the faculty. It should be called
the handbook for the faculty rather than the faculty handbook because
the faculty handbook gives the impression that the faculty has some
say as to what goes in there whereas actually it's administrative rules
which are not made by the faculty but which the faculty are forced to
follow. I think the AAUP is the only organization that actually gives
any protection, really, under such a setup where it is possible that
this interpretation may come down to what may be legal conflicts and
other types of conflicts that may exist. All right, on salary it's very
difficult to say what we've been able to do. The national will not support
us in salary fights. They have just such a heavy work load on questions
of people being dismissed for other reasons that where a university
or college claims that they are dismissing people because Of the problems
of finances we just have not been very effective in that particular
situation. I was at a meeting in Cleveland just a month ago in which
this was discussed, and it was generally agreed, and I certainly agree,
that the states are simply going to have to be the final or at least
semi-final, and much more emphasis on the "final" part than
on the "semi" in dealing with these cases because these cases
are just multiplying. There are too many cases of injustices, or at
least apparent injustices, where faculty members are
31
dismissed, and the question of whether
they were dismissed on a justifiable basis is a very serious question
as far as we're concerned. And this is what we are dealing with. I can
give you one case that took place on another campus in Virginia where
a faculty member's salary was simply cut $5,000. Our contention was
that this was the equivalent of dismissal. We could not get the national
to take the case as a dismissal case on the basis of that. And this
is the sort of thing where, having much more knowledge of the situation
on the state level than they would have on the national level, I think
that we could operate much more successfully. So that this is just at
the point now, Jim, of being a factor that we're considering at the
state level in our state board. And we're going after this question
of how far we ought to get into it ourselves. We've largely been bypassed,
and I think this is very much our own fault. The stronger state organizations,
such as that in Ohio and Michigan - they handle many of these cases
themselves, and they feel that they can do a good deal of it. Now, one
of the things that the Ohio chapter has done, which I'd like to see
done more in Virginia, is that the Ohio chapter has worked with the
administration. They've trained a group on the state level who go to
a campus if there is a conflict between the faculty and the administration.
They will go to that campus, and they will work with the administration
to try to get a set of rules which are mutually agreeable. And I think
this is going to have to be done. You see, the problems of the sixties
were very minor problems, as far as AAUP is concerned because during
that period practically every campus in the state was expanding. We
looked upon this as a permanent situation. The seventies changed this
a good deal. For one thing, with the number of community colleges there
are in the state, the senior colleges and universities are not growing.
They are simply finding that what would have been the growth is now
being taken off or siphoned off for the first and second year students
going for a much smaller charge, much smaller tuition, to the campuses
of these other institutions such as the one in Virginia Beach, the one
in Chesapeake, or the one in Portsmouth, and saving themselves a good
deal of money. The AAUP now finds that with the tremendous overload
of applications for college jobs compared with the number available
that the administrations have become much
more - I don't like the word "arbitrary," but I don't know
exactly what else to call it in their dealing with the faculty members.
And the result has been that the faculty members in so many institutions
in Virginia are beginning to feel as if they're really employees rather
than professional people, and they resent it. And this is not just Virginia,
this is virtually a nationwide phenomenon. The reason that Virginia's
a special situation is that Virginia's the only state that we could
find, when we talked at the national conventions of the AAUP - the only
one - in which the presidents could give a zero increase in salary to
a faculty member. Well, if you give a zero increase to a faculty member
during a time of inflation, you're cutting him quite considerably. If
you count ten percent inflation, in a couple years it's well over twenty
percent. It isn't just ten plus ten, it's ten on the original plus ten
on the next, which adds up to much more than ten on the original. And
you add it up in three years, he's got a third cut in salary, and he
can't live decently if he's got a family; he's in a very tough situation.
We think this is much too much of an arbitrary situation as far as this
is concerned, and we're hopeful that the presidents are going to be
much more human about this in the future than they have been in the
past and see to it that the individuals get a much more equitable dealing
as far as salaries are concerned. So that this is one thing where the
AAUP has been very active. And I believe that indirectly we have made
a contribution, but I can't show a direct contribution as far as salaries
are concerned. As far as protecting tenure is concerned, I think we
can show in many cases that we have been instrumental in protecting
tenure. This gets to be a very serious problem where an institution
such as Old Dominion cuts out requirements, such as the language requirement,
and the result is that the number of students per faculty member declines
so tremendously that it gets to be a very difficult situation. And we
may be in the very near future in a conflict with the administration
on the question of protecting tenure. The only rule that we have on
the national basis for this is that if people are dismissed for reasons
of finances, which would have to be the argument that would be used
in this case, that they cannot rehire for two years. The reason that
33
the AAUP won such a resounding victory
at Bloomfield, New Jersey, was not just because of the protection of
tenure but because they fired certain individuals, according to their
statement, for economic reasons and then hired others. You cannot fire
a man just because he's in the upper bracket economically. For example,
you cannot fire your full professors and hire instructors just in order
to save money; the AAUP will not stand for that. So there are certain
protections that the AAUP does give, most of which the average college
professor is not even aware of, and many of them are not even members
of the AAUP. I'm not going to ask you how active your status is. But
we do consider that the number of people who are members is vital because
where we have a large proportion of the faculty, such as in the University
of Virginia or Washington and Lees where of course the incomes are higher,
this is not such a big demand in proportion to their income as it would
be in the, for example, an instructor or maybe even an assistant professor
at Old Dominion University. But where that is a very high proportion,
then the AAUP usually has a very good voice in the situation.
Sweeney: Did you ever advocate unionization, AFL-CIO?
Stern: Oh, you know, Jim, you've
dug up so much more about my past than I've remembered that this part
has amazed me. Well, 'let me tell' you briefly because the one thing
you didn't get into very much was my current situation. I'm on three
state boards at the present time. One of them is the Association for
Justice in Virginia, which is concerned with trying to deal with such
situations as the problems of people in jail and their rights and to
try to get more probation and to try to shorten sentences and get parole
and trying to equalize and make sentences equitable and trying to see
to it that our jails are decent and that people that are sentenced to
prison for two years or more get some sort of training so that it isn't
just a complete waste of time in their lives and they come out with
no qualifications other than the qualifications that got them into jail
in the first place, and most of them get back into jail because of that.
So that we've operated a very stupid system in Virginia right now, although
the Governor said just the other day that he
34
thought that the people of Virginia
were willing to pay a good deal more - in fact, I think, the statement
may have come out yesterday - that they've paid in the past and are
willing to pay a little increase in taxes and get better treatment for
the prisoners. Interestingly enough, when Godwin was in his first term
he said that prisoners have no rights whatsoever. This is off our general
discussion, but you can toss this in a footnote somewhere. The other
two boards I'm on is the one of the AAUP, which we have discussed just
briefly, and the third one that I'm on ties in with this point that
you've just asked about. I've been on for two years as a representative
for the American Association of University Professors on a state board
which is concerned about unionization in Virginia. As you may be familiar
with, and I assume you are, in Virginia public employees have no right
to organize. The group came together, and the president of it is Harold
Chafeburger, a member of the Firefighters. We are tying in with the
national organization - just recently; this part has happened within
the last month, the last few months, this summer, that we've been tying
in with the national organization which operates across the country
to deal with public employees and the question of unionization. A law
went through last year in which the unionization bill at the last minute
in the General Assembly had tacked on to it a $10,000-a-day fine for
any day in a strike and dismissal with no right to work for the state
for another year. This penalty was just so tremendous that it killed
the bill. I don't know what's going to come out of it this year have
been up before the General Assembly. I've talked to many members of
- up before a committee of the General Assembly. I've talked to many
members of the General Assembly. There's a good deal of sympathy for
the right of public employees to unionize. I see no logical basis on
which you can say that public employees cannot unionize but the telephone
company workers can unionize, that Vepco workers can unionize. I can
see very little of public employment that could be any more detrimental
than a strike in those fields. So that if they're going to argue from
the standpoint of strike, that would seem to nullify that position and
make it contradictory. On the other hand, all of us on this board are
perfectly willing to put into that law -in fact, we did, the law that
we drafted last year. We drafted our first law that was ever drafted,
as far as I know, in Virginia for this purpose two years ago just
35
when I came on the board, was drafted
with the help of union members, and our representative for our actual
drafting, who is Ronald Brown of the William and Mary law school. So
that when you ask, am I in favor of this, I've been working for it for
two years; I suspect it's going to take at least another year. We're
hopeful of getting it by the House this year - a decent bill. Now I
frankly believe it's going to take at least one more election to the
Virginia Senate with some changes in the membership of the Virginia
Senate before we're going to get the legislation through. Once this
gets through, I'm not saying that Old Dominion is going to be one of
the early ones; it may not be at all. But I'm all in favor of the idea
that any public employee should have the right at least to join the
union as long as the no-strike provision is in the legislation. So I
don't know whether that's been a long and rambling answer to what you
wanted, but that's it.
Sweeney: Let's go back to 1954, then, and to the Supreme
Court decision. When the Brown decision was handed down by the Supreme
Court, did you and your students in your discussions feel that this was
going to be momentous for Virginia, or did you feel perhaps that Virginia
could get along with it and adjust to it and there wouldn't be too much
difficulty?
Stern: Oh, I can answer that
by saying that we started out with a very high level of optimism. We
had, particularly with the unanimity of the decision, the belief that
this was a barrier that had been crossed and that it would be accepted.
Knowing you and the closeness with which you follow Virginia politics
- in the short time you've been here you've become a remarkable expert
in the field - I'm sure you remember that the Governor announced the
first day that Virginia would comply, that Virginia always had a reputation
of obedience to law. Well, unfortunately, the governors have never really
been governors in Virginia because they've been the people who take
their orders from a higher authority, in this case, Senator Byrd. And
Senator Byrd immediately took the line of massive resistance. And the
massive' resistance line which Senator Byrd took forced the Governor
to shift his position immediately
36
and changed Virginia. And Virginia
had a special session in '54 and put in legislation to close the schools;
as soon as it became a choice between integration and closing the schools,
the schools would be closed. I remember asking one man in Norfolk if
his attitude toward this, since he was in favor of the legislation,
was that public schools were something that was given by the rich to
try to help the poor get an education, and therefore they had a perfect
right to close the schools if the schools were not operating in accordance
with the position that those in authority thought they should be operating,
namely, segregated. And he said, yes, that was right. And you've come
in here too recently to really realize the aristocratic nature of Virginia
politics in the fifties. It's changed an awful lot since then. The young
Turks who came in in the early fifties did a lot for Virginia; for example,
in the field of medical health, they virtually turned it around from
what was almost a Medieval situation to - well, it isn't that good today
that they've got an accreditation; I think just one of the institutions,
as far as I know, in Virginia has got an accreditation. But the funds
for mental health and so forth have improved tremendously. But Virginia
still was operating very much on the aristocratic level of politics.
And therefore the schools were not looked upon as an essential function
of the state, that private schools could handle it, and that public
schools were only needed for the poor. Well, this is an attitude that
doesn't operate in most of the United States but still has to be faced
in Virginia. So that it wasn't too surprising. It was terribly disappointing,
but not too surprising when the legislature put through this type of
legislation accepting the massive resistance principle. The first effort
was to try to get a gray plan which was based on local option, a system
which caused Virginia to get in for a lot of punning during that period
that black and white were now going to be modified by the gray plan.
Sweeney: Did you favor the local option? I mean as
opposed to the massive resistance?
37
Stern: Yes. If I'd realized that
we were going to be in a worse position. But I was still optimistic.
I thought, faced with the choices, if it was forced down to a choice,
I had. . . .I think part of the problem that we face here, Jim, is that
living at this end of the state, you don't get the impact that you get
through a good deal of the state; for example, in Richmond the attitude
is so different. The legislators are - not so much today, in the seventies,
but because you've got people like Ferguson Reed, who is a black who
was elected from Richmond and is the first black in the General Assembly.
We've gotten some changes. But back in those days, it was certainly
a misreading on our part. We should have gone for the gray plan, and
we didn't. We honestly believed that, when the situation came face to
face, that the state would back down and accept the law, which it did
not do. And it just became a very serious situation. None of us really
believed that at that stage when we voted against the gray plan that
it would get to the point where we believed this was the only alternative
to massive resistance. We believed 'that the people of Virginia were
too intelligent to accept that position. So that when it came toward
'58 and seventeen black students applied for entering the Norfolk schools,
we were just astounded that this was going to happen in Norfolk. The
school board at that time under chairman Paul Schweitzer did an excellent
job in trying to work with the city council and trying to convince them
to take the position that the schools should remain open at all costs.
However, the city council wasn't about to accept that position. It would
take so long to go through what happened in 1958 that I suggest we hold
off on this. This is the one thing that I would say, that I take more
pride in this work for the Norfolk Committee for the Public Schools
than any public contribution that I've made. We formed an initial committee
in 1958 in the spring when it looked to us as if the schools were going
to be closed. That initial committee consisted of James Brewer, who
was the Minister of the Unitarian Church, and who has since left this
city and was out of the country for awhile and is now back in the country,
but not in this part of the country. And he was excellent; he had the
only church that really fully
38
backed the minister on the integration
side, even on the side of keeping the schools open, regardless of the
question of integration, which is really the position we took. And the
other one is Eugenia Dare, who is still a very good friend, and myself.
And we were hopeful that more powerful political figures would back
this group. It never did get that backing. And we finally realized that
we were going to have to do everything we could. So what we did was,
we tried to hold some meetings during the summer. But every time we
did, the people that we called would say, "They're not going to
let the schools close." And "they," of course, meant
Senator Byrd. And many of them honestly believed that when the time
came that the schools would be open. We tried to get some meetings during
the summer. The largest number of people we could get out by telephone
efforts was twelve people. The difference between that and the fall
when the schools were actually closed is that our membership, actually,
we had 6,000 members pay a dollar apiece to join. And you must remember
that we did not allow any black members. Now you may say, "Well,
here, for a person who's worked his life in interracial work and who
rejects all forms of discrimination, that this is rather incredible."
But the truth of the matter was that politically it would have been
absolutely impossible to function in the situation that operated in
1958 if we'd allowed black membership. So we had to tell them very sadly
that we were simply returning their money when black members did send
in money, but we had an entirely white group of 6,000. We did have a
mass meeting at the arena which drew several thousand people; I have
no idea of what the actual numbers were; maybe the papers of the time
will tell you on that score. But the whole atmosphere changed and ultimately
we recognized chiefly Ellis James' leadership, and he was the one in
whose name the case was brought, that we'd have to fight it by two cases,
one in the state courts and one in the national courts in order to open
up the schools again. But I was caught in the unusual situation that
three of my children - all three of my children - were in secondary
schools at this point in time so that we set up on campus a special
school. The oldest one we sent off to live with cousins in New York
State, but that was because she had to have a school where she could
have science; the other two came in here.
39
And these students were largely
taught by faculty and students. We got Ross Fink, who was dean of education,
to set up the school for us and to administer it. And here you had faculty
members teaching children in grades from about eight through twelve
- maybe seven through twelve, I'm not sure. But the faculty, students,
and friends of the faculty who came there - we did this voluntarily.
We didn't take any pay for it, and I don't think we even charged any
tuition, as far as I can remember, maybe just enough to keep the cost,
take care of our incidental costs. We had a building which has since
disappeared that was on campus for years and used afterwards for, I
think, the sociology and philosophy departments, as their offices. But
these schools were set up all over the city. They were not satisfactory.
They didn't do, as I said, science work at all on any satisfactory laboratory
basis, and you can't really operate schools. . . .In other fields I
think that, due to the small size of classes, the students probably
learned more, and the drive to learn was tremendous. You have to realize
that these youngsters who were being cut out of their public schools,
many of them just didn't go, as I mentioned before, that many of them
just wandered the streets. But those that went to school were really
interested, in a drive that was almost unbelievable for youngsters in
the junior high school and high school level. So that we used the money
that we raised to get Mr. Campbell, an attorney in Northern Virginia,
to work with - oh, I can picture the man who's the lawyer that we got
here in Norfolk, and I see him not too often, maybe once every year
or so, but I'll give you his name - who handled the case for us from
this angle. We didn't move very fast on the question of a case simply
because of the fact that the case in Arlington was actually ahead of
ours and put into court ahead of ours. But what happened was that the
judge in the federal court in Arlington gave them till the first of
January to integrate, whereas our decision, which was handed down later
by Judge Hoffman here, required us to integrate in September, which
was the reason that we were the schools that were closed and they were
the schools that stayed open. But Campbell had become familiar with
it in planning a brief for the Northern Virginia, and he was tremendous
in the court cases in helping us win those court cases. (End of tape)
40
(Sweeney: The name that Professor Stern was trying to
recall was Archie Boswell, a Norfolk attorney.)
Stern: So that one thing I didn't
tell you, Jim, was the fact that, in the summer of 1958, while those
of us who took the position informing the Committee for the Public Schools
it was necessary for action to be taken on our part were trying to get
support, we started with a series of letters, getting at least two a
week into the Virginian-Pilot to strengthen our cause and to
use to try to get people to support us. During the summer we were only
able to get about thirteen people to a meeting, but every time we got
a new face we'd ask that person to write another letter. I remember
at one time we didn't have any letters in for a week, and I and others
on the committee started getting calls from friends who asked if we'd
given up. We said no, we hadn't given up; we'd just temporarily run
out of ideas. But we came back at it, and I think that was one of the
things that kept the idea alive that Norfolk was going to be dealing
with this, not just in terms of setting up schools to deal with it but
actually in terms of trying to get an organization going, a meaningful
organization that would actually be able to effectively raise the funds
that we needed to propagandize and to get sufficient support financially
for a case. Although at that time we thought we could do this politically,
as time went on it proved absolutely necessary that these court cases
be formed for the purpose of fighting, and that was the reason why we
turned to Archie Boswell. We did get offers from other attorneys, interestingly
enough, but they were chiefly black attorneys, and we felt that it would
be politically unwise to use a black attorney in a case of this nature.
So that we waited until we found one who would take it for us, and Archie
Boswell proved to be very capable and, with the aid of Mr. Campbell
from Northern Virginia, did an excellent research and briefing and helped
us very tremendously in the court case, and we won, as you know, on
both the state and national level. We won on the national level first,
but Judge Hoffman held off his decision until the state came through
so that both were handed down the same day, and the double impact, I
think, was very tremendous in being beneficial.
41
Sweeney: Have you ever heard that the state decision
was handed down before the federal because the people in Virginia might
feel that the state court would be more familiar with the Virginia situation?
Stern: Yes, I've heard it, but
I actually believe that the intent was to try to get the double impact.
Of course, in Virginia with some still segregationist sentiment even
toward the United States government, not just toward white and black,
I think that this is probably a very wise decision on the part of Judge
Hoffman to do it this way. One footnote I'd like to throw in on this
is the fact that you read and hear that the businessmen of Norfolk did
a good deal to get the schools open. They didn't do anything, really.
They were absolutely useless, as far as that was concerned. They were
tremendously helpful, though, in getting a full-page ad out shortly
before the schools did open, and this full-page ad was helpful in setting
the tenor and establishing a mood whereby the people of Norfolk were
willing to accept the opening of the schools on an integrated basis,
even though it was a very minimum integrated basis- I think one of the
big news items of that time. It's interesting also to note, Jim, that
the Norfolk Report for those years never mentioned anything. The city
report never mentioned anything about the schools closing or the schools
reopening.
Sweeney: Did you favor the city's petitioning Governor
Almond to return the schools to local control and have them operated with
local funds in that referendum in late 1958?
Stern: The referendum in 1958
was one that I fought against in this sense. We got an attorney by the
name of Mr. Delaney, if my memory serves me correctly, to take the case
before Judge Eggleston to try to appeal to have this referendum as worded
on the ballot declared illegal. The reason was that the way in which
it was placed on the ballot was that if the schools were open on local
referendum there would be of necessity a high cost paid by each parent
with children in the schools. Very obviously nobody knew about this,
whether it was true or whether it was false, but it was put in for propaganda
purposes to try to get people to vote against it. I think that it was
effective in getting people to vote against it. I voted for it, but
it was
42
such a loaded referendum that it
really didn't stand any chance of passage in the way in which it was
worded. And if you've seen the referendum, you know how it was loaded.
Sweeney: Did you personally get involved with teaching
any of the displaced students?
Stern: Well, let me go back a
moment to that other question. I tried to get the attorney to understand
my point, and I think that we came very close to winning that case.
In fact, I think that if we had had a fair referendum I think we would
have won it. The point was that I never could get him to understand
the way in which I wanted the case presented. I think he was an old-time
attorney. I didn't have anything to do with hiring him. I think part
of it was financial; we didn't have that much money at that stage of
the game. But I think the other part of it was that he was so set on
how he was going to handle this, and he kept saying that this was a
blackjack over our heads, and I said, "Well, that isn't the point.
The point is that there's no way of proving whether a statement is true
or false, and you have no right to put a statement on a referendum which
can be either true or false and cannot be proven." This was the
argument. But I never could get him to see it, and he never took that
argument. And I think we'd have won the case if he'd been willing to
follow that point that I was trying to make on that situation. But we
didn't, and that's part of history. As I told you before, I did teach
on campus. We set up a campus school under Ross Fink, who was dean of
education, who helped us to set it up and did the administration for
us. We had a building on campus. 'We taught - oh, there'd be about ten
or a dozen students in class, most of whom were children of faculty
members, but additional youngsters were children of friends, they were
children of the administrators and staff, library people and so forth.
We had a very good student body, in fact, I think probably one of the
best in the country for that particular year.
Sweeney: On the academic side at that time, were you
teaching basically the same courses by then as you had, which you talked
about in the late 1940's?
Stern: No, by that time, although
I still once in a while taught a course in history when an opportunity
came, and I've
43
always enjoyed it and find history
teaching a wonderful challenge. We were pretty much departmentalized
in our own field at that stage, and I don't think I was teaching anything
other than political science courses. I was teaching comparative government
at that stage, which I haven't taught in, I guess, about ten years now,
and my field of teaching was entirely political science. In other words,
we had enough student body by this stage in political science so that
I could spend the full time in the political science field.
Sweeney: Could you tell me something about an organization
called the Citizens for Democratic Government, about its goals and its
formation and what its activities were?
Stern: Yes, I'll even give you
now this CDG Manifesto, as we called it. I didn't like the word "manifesto,"
but it was used and I think it did have some impact. The Citizens for
Democratic Government, which would be a group of individuals who really
were trying to broaden the base of politics, to bring it down to the
grass roots. The voting turnout in the 1950's was a few thousand coming
out for city council - ridiculous in comparison with the population.
Registration was low; we were still under the poll tax. But, as I said
before, it isn't the poll tax nearly as much as it was the system of
registration which was designed to keep registration at a minimum. I
remember once being up, for example, in one of the counties in Virginia
and seeing a sign on a store which said that the grocery store would
be open for registration that Saturday, one of the two Saturdays a year
which were open for registration. So that many counties in the state
at that time didn't even have a particular place other than the registrar's
home where people could go to register. And I think this had the effect
of keeping black registration down very decidedly because black people
could go to - well, at that time we would say "Negro" - Negro
people could go to a home and go to the back door for some things, but
you can't expect people to go to the back door to register to vote.
That is a citizen's right, and it's just as wrong as it can be for people
to expect that using a private residence that way could be classified
as anything other than setting up a racial barrier. And this is one
of the reasons why CDG was formed because, although registration -
44
I can't remember the Colonel's name,
I guess given time I could, who ran registration during this time and
was a friend of the Byrd machine and was our general registrar and considered
it his God-given duty to try to keep down the number of people registered
in Norfolk. But CDG was formed to get a very wide registration, and
a good deal of our time then and, I guess, to be perfectly honest, since
has been fighting the electoral board in Norfolk, which has never really
been cooperative. One of the very definite reasons why there's a larger
turnout in Richmond than there is in Norfolk, although they have almost
fifty percent more people in Norfolk, is not the military; it's simply
the fact that registration is more convenient in Richmond than it is
in Norfolk. Registration in Virginia Beach is much more convenient than
it is in Norfolk, and I suspect that with not too much passage of time
since their registration system is based on the old borough system that
they will actually be able to have a larger turnout in their elections
than we have in Norfolk. And there's no reason for this other than the
fact that we have never really had an electoral board that really believed
in trying to get a large turnout of voters in the city of Norfolk. And
this has been a hard thing to fight through the years, and CDG was one
of the first organizations for that purpose. It was created also to
run candidates particularly for the city and for the House of Delegates
and for the Virginia Senate and 'to' support candidates who supported
us. So that this is why CDG came into existence, and I think it had
a tremendous impact on Norfolk politics and helped definitely in broadening
the base of elections. I'm sorry I'm not helping you very much on dates
at this point; I think that I can do that later.
Sweeney: In 1960 did you participate in any way in
John F. Kennedy's campaign, which seemed to bring a lot Of new people
into the Democratic Party in Norfolk?
Stern: Yes, I've participated
in virtually every election since '49 and been a fairly active Democrat
in every election, at least on the precinct level and usually on the
city level. So that I did take part in that, although not any particular
part. One good thing was it did bring out some of
45
our Catholic friends who have been
so helpful in politics in Norfolk, particularly, ever since. And that
would be specifically and most important, Bingo Stant, Joe Fitzpatrick,
and our own professor, Richard Rutyna in history.
Sweeney: When was a separate political science department
set up at Old Dominion College?
Stern: This came into existence
in 1965 and was, I would say, a good deal overdue. It came with the
arrival of Grant Mead and his coming in. We had a rule that there couldn't
be a department without at least three people at the time, and very
shortly after that four, but we came into existence with three. And
the department expanded very rapidly. I think we had fifty majors the
first year we opened, and within a couple of years we were increasing
about fifty a year and we were up to about two hundred very quickly,
over two hundred, very quickly, as a total number of majors.
Sweeney: Did you get a major as soon as the department
was created, or was there a time lapse? It seems to be vague from the
catalogs, to get a major.
Stern: Well, I can check on this
for you, Jim, but as far as my memory is concerned, we were able to
get a major, I think, in '66. It wouldn't take too much effort to check
that and give you the definite date and information, but I think we
had our first majors - we had, as I said, my memory is fifty people
sign up as majors the first year that we became a separate department,
people who had simply been waiting for it. In fact, we had many people
waiting for becoming majors long before we got the department.
Sweeney: Has there been a large turnover of faculty
in the political science department in the nine years that it has been
in existence, or is the group today pretty much the same group as back
in 1965?
Stern: Well, that's something
like saying is it the same group when you start out with a one-horse
shay and end up with four horses pulling a much larger carriage. We
have expanded considerably, and Grant Mead has stayed on
46
as the only one who has headed the
department in its history. John Ramsey was here before Grant Mead, and
I was here before John Ramsey, so I guess that's the historical background.
The rest of the department -I would say John Bennett is the oldest of
that group, and I think he'd be about five years, if my memory is correct.
The others have all been three years or less but have come in due to
the expansion. There hasn't been a great deal of turnover. What has
happened is that the department has expanded quite considerably through
the years.
Sweeney: Did you offer geography in the political
science department, or was that. . . . Sometimes in the press, you see
the reference to the department of political science and geography.
Stern: Yes. Up until this last
year, we used the hyphenated term to indicate that geography was a part
of political science. But last year, for reasons of joining an honorary
political science fraternity which required that the name be limited
to political science, and for that reason we dropped it. We did have
the hyphenated name to indicate that geography was a part. I think the
objection of the people in this fraternity was that it implied that
we were teaching both. This was not the case. People in political science
were not teaching geography; people in geography were not teaching political
science. But the hyphenated implication was that, so we simply dropped
the title of "geography." But yes, through the years I don't
know when we first hyphenated it, but for several years, I guess about
six years it was a hyphenated combination. We still have geography within
the department, but it's no longer listed as part of the department
name.
Sweeney: It seems that the Young Democrats were very
strong on the campus in the mid-sixties. Now they seem to be virtually
non-existent. So how do you account for their decline?
Stern: You might find a lot of
opposition from Tyler Stant, who's the editor of the paper here and
who is also the head of the Young Democrats, at least was - I don't
think he is for this year. But as most campus groups, it got strong
in presidential years and weak in other
47
years. It's very
difficult to judge the strength of a group like this. I think most of
it depends upon the leadership, and in the 1960's, early 1960's, I think
we had very good leadership in the Young Democrats on campus. And since
then it just has not had the leadership that it has had in the past.
I don't even know who the sponsor of it is at the present time, but
I think that the potentiality is there. There's another reason, too,
and that is that during the 1960's the JFK Democrats was created many
- oh, for a long time they met very close by campus, I think mostly
at King's Head Inn, which is right across the street, the result being
that many of the college students came into that rather than coming
- particularly the good ones, who would be the natural leaders, went
into that organization rather than sticking with the campus organization.
I think that's one of the reasons why we haven't had the voice that
we would have had in the past.
Sweeney: What was "Airlie," an organization
whose monthly meeting was held here at your invitation in December of
1966? It seems to have been an anti-Byrd group. I wanted to know something
about its origin, its goals, and who led it.
Stern: Okay. The name "Airlie,"
which is a rather unusual name, refers to an actual residence which
at that time was maintained by the Episcopal Diocese in Northern Virginia.
The reason for it was that the minister who came from Texas and who
actually generated a good deal of the steam that formed this group into
existence was a man whose background in the Episcopal Church - his work
was to deal with Episcopal schools, and he travels about, I guess, 30,000
miles or more a year in dealing with the various Episcopal schools around
the country, as far west as Hawaii. And it met there. I was not a member
in those days when it met at Airlie. And I came into it a couple of
years after it was formed, and most of our meetings were held in the
Richmond area for reasons of centralism as far as geography is concerned.
The group had a very strong leadership. Included in the leadership actually
was George Rawlings, who at that time was actually the head of the Eighth
Congressional District Democrats, Gus Johnson, who was head of the Tenth
Congressional District Democrats, Joe Fitzpatrick, who was head of the
Second Congressional District Democrats. These three were very
48
important to the group, particularly
George and Gus. Henry Howell didn't take that much part as far as meetings
were concerned, but Henry Howell, when he did attend, would help us
get about three or four times the turnout that we would get for anybody
else in the group,. I asked the group to come down here, in fact, the
first time it had met at anybody's invitation other than the chairman,
and this group did come down. I got Joe "Fitz" to give the
report on the 1966 election. You may remember that that was a tremendously
important election because we had two Senators up, which is an unusual
situation in any state and did manage to help with Spong's election
and particularly in the primary this group worked very 'hard for Spong
and also very hard to try to unseat Harry Byrd, Jr., who had been appointed
ad interim when his father became too ill to continue in the
position as Senator - and came close to unseating - we did unseat Robertson
and came very close to unseating Byrd. And we felt that this was a very
worthwhile operation. I think the group was anxious to try to get grassroots
support and to increase membership in the state legislature; that was
the chief aim at the time. If there was an anti-Byrd group, it had powerful
leadership around the state, and I think that, without a shadow of a
doubt, it did have some influence on the trends within the Democratic
Party in the 1960's. And I would call it a very important group; for
example, I worked with a committee in which we drew up lines for the
new Congressional District. And this was, I think, a fairly scholarly
work, a very difficult thing to do without trying to change things too
much politically. But trying to keep an even balance based on the decision
in Baker vs. Carr and subsequent cases to that, Reynolds vs. Simms and
Gray vs. Saunders, the group who was determined to try to get an equitable
distribution and at the same time we were well aware of the fact that
politics does play a part in the reorganization of any state.
Sweeney: I was just wondering if another prominent Episcopal
person in the state, Armistead Booth, had anything to do with this?
Stern: You might almost say tangentially.
He didn't come to our meetings. I think he came to one that I can remember,
and that would be about it. But Armistead Booth did look for support
from many in that group, and I think if he
49
had been elected, it would have
greatly strengthened the group. The fact that he missed so closely,
as Armistead Booth said when we had a conversation after the election
that, in answer to my question as to whether the illness of Harry Byrd,
Sr., and then subsequent death, was really the decisive factor in the
election. He said, "It isn't that I feel it was the decisive factor
in the election, it's probably that Harry Byrd, Jr., is well aware of
the fact that this was the decisive factor in the election that's important."
Sweeney: During the 1960's there were some questions
in respect to suppression of dissent on campus, especially in regard to
Professor Leland Peterson and an issue of the literary magazine, The
Gadfly, to which he was an advisor. You were the vice chairman of
the American Civil Liberties Union chapter in Norfolk at that time. Were
you concerned that ideas which were, perhaps, unpopular were being suppressed
on campus at that time?
Stern: That is what's known as
a self-answering question. I don't know whether you've seen any of the
correspondence. Yes, we had quite a bit of correspondence between the
chapter, mostly one way, between the chapter and the college. We were
extremely concerned about this. I'll tell you, it goes a good deal back,
I believe, on Peterson's case. You may remember that North Carolina
did put in a law in which the Board of Governors was supposed to keep
a close eye upon who's going to appear on campus and barring certain
groups from appearing on college and university campuses in North Carolina.
Well, it's a coincidence that there are two brothers, both named Stone,
and both of whom introduce the measures in their respective states.
Senator Stone in North Carolina got his through. I frankly think that
Senator Stone in Virginia would have gotten a similar bill through if
it weren't for the fact that the shades of Thomas Jefferson have been
powerful and helped us in this particular instance to prevent that from
taking place. But despite that fact there have been throughout the history
of, I think, every institution situations which have arisen. And I think
this was really one of the most unfortunate situations, if not the most
unfortunate, that arose during the entire presidency of President Webb.
And the sad part was that this should have taken place just toward the
end of his presidency. And I helped bring Leland Peterson not only into
the American Civil Liberties
50
Union but also onto the board. He
was a member of the Board of the American Civil Liberties Union, and
I think that he was still on the board at the time that this took place.
So that we were thoroughly opposed to any attempt to regulate what could
be said on campus. I think a good deal of it was both arbitrary and,
I think, ill advised all around. Apparently what happened was - you
may be familiar with the story, but anyway it was a story in The
Gadfly in which presumably Mary gives birth to a child who is part
Negro, the father presumably being Negro. This caused resentment on
the part of two black ministers in town, although we never could find
the names, but at least presumably these two ministers called Godwin
and took umbrage on it. Godwin called President Webb, and President
Webb, I'm pretty sure, being aware of the impact that this could have
upon the funds for the institution, decided that he'd better do something
about it. He announced that he was holding up Dr. Peterson's salary....
(end of tape).So
that he indicated - well, the case went before the Board. Dr. Peterson
had to appear before the Board. He was treated abominably by at least
one member of the Board who wanted to know why he didn't supervise the
operation of The Gadfly more directly. Leland Peterson said that
he felt that college students were able to supervise themselves. When
they had a question, he was their sponsor and they could come to him
and he would help them. He didn't have anything to do with what material
went into the publication. And some of these people took the position
that he should have demanded that everything be submitted to him so
that he could have known what went in there and decided whether it was
appropriate or not appropriate for a college publication, that when
a college finances the publication it has a perfect right to see to
it that what goes in is appropriate for it. And this was something Dr.
Peterson did not agree with. It caused quite a conflict between President
Webb and Dr. Peterson. President Webb held up his salary, and it got
into the newspapers and became a sensational case. The result was, I
think, unfortunate for our institution in the way it came out. Ultimately
it was resolved with Peterson getting the raise which he had been denied
and the thing just calmed down after awhile. But it never should have
come up. It was. . . oh,
51
one thing I should mention in connection
with it was that we did hold an AAUP chapter meeting here on campus,
drafted a letter, and Betsy Creekmore took this letter over to Mr. Webb
personally, and I think this was one of the things that was instrumental
in bringing the thing to a rather sudden end because Peterson was called
in the next day and given the raise. So I think the AAUP really had
much more to do with it than the ACLU as far as settling it was concerned.
Sweeney: During the spring of 1968 you served as Robert
Kennedy's campaign manager in the Second District. Most of the people
in the academic community back then seemed to be supporting Senator Eugene
McCarthy, and I was wondering why you chose to support Senator Robert
Kennedy?
Stern: I've been an admirer of
two thirds of the Kennedy clan for a long time, and I was very strong
- I'll tell you frankly, I still feel today, as I felt then, that Robert
Kennedy, had he lived, could have brought the United States together
in a way that I don't know of anybody that could do it today. We have
a lot of people who talk that way in politics, but I think he had the
capacity to do it. I think he could have brought white and black together;
I think he could have brought the laboring man and businessman together.
He was a fighter, and I think that there's a tendency on the part of
a lot of people to fail to really evaluate the man. One reason that
I know is because the classification of "hatchet man" was
given to him, contending that he was the Kennedy who did this sort of
"hatchet job" whenever it needed to be done on some political
figure. I don't know whether there's any truth in it or not, but my
point was that I did subscribe - long before I heard Robert Kennedy
use the term - I did subscribe to him as the type of individual who,
rather than look at things that are and say "Why?" looked
at things that are not and say "Why not?" And so that I think
that he really could have helped change the country. Also, I'm a political
realist. I'm not going to - you asked me why I didn't work for Hutchinson,
or if I worked for Hutchinson, and I said "No." I just never
thought that realistically there was any possibility, and I felt the
same way about Eugene McCarthy. Even when I had met him after the election,
52
I went to hear him
then, I never felt that the man was that really - I don't know - to
use a conventional phrase, "with it." As some of my friends
said, McCarthy was a picture of an audience trying to turn a candidate
on. I think the man's a poet; I think he's a visionary; I think he's
a fine person; I think he has a lot in his favor. But McCarthy was not
really in the running for the nomination for the presidency in 1968,
and I think that gave a lot of people - incidentally, Leland Peterson
was the one who headed up the McCarthy effort here, that we were just
talking about. But this was not realistic, as far as I was concerned.
And I felt that, on the part of political realism, that Kennedy was
a real possibility who could do more for the country than any other
candidate of either party that I was aware of. And it was a real pleasure
to work for him. Just one footnote on this one, also, and that is that
my contact in Washington with the national headquarters was Mary Jo
Kopechne.
Sweeney: Now, you worked with Professor Reed, T. J.
Reed, in statistical analysis of election returns. I was wondering what
purpose you used these - you might have used them, perhaps, in the redistricting
suit involving Norfolk members of the state Senate?
Stern: Yes, this was, so that
the actual statistical analysis of particular elections was done, really,
just out of interest in informing people and helping people to understand
what was happening. I noticed one of the columns that I looked at several
months ago when I had opportunity or necessity, really, to go back and
find some other reports, was that there was a larger turnout in the
Democratic primary than there was in the general election one time.
So that proved that there were more Democrats than there were people
in Norfolk, which Wheeler apparently got a kick out of; he's now working
in the Virginia Beach government. But, yes, this did provide us with
experience, collecting and analysis of data, and then in the time when
the redistricting suit came up, what happened was that - I don't know
whether it was T. J. Reed or Henry Howell suggested, one or the other
- we collected data on the zip code of the various people in the Navy
and
53
found the distribution of that.
Using that distribution - and it did take a good deal of work, but it
was fun because we had a feeling when we got through with it that we
had a pretty good case, and this is what turned out. And Henry Howell
took the case to the Supreme Court, and using the figures that T. J.
Reed had supplied as a result of the work that we had done, he said
that he was able to win that case because the people - you see, our
argument was that putting the entire Naval Base in one Senator's precinct
would give him a voting population of about half that it would for the
other Senators, and we didn't feel that that was fair in terms of one
man. The problem being one man, one vote, and that there was no way
of dividing the Base into the three districts, and we felt that the
number on the Base, which is actually more than 36,000, you see, who
are not living on the Base but were assigned to ships at sea, and this
is part of our population of 307,000 in the 1970 census, was this 36,000.
We felt that this was such a sizable proportion of our adult population
that the result was that these people ought not to be put in any one
district, and we were able to win the case on the fact that there ought
to be three Senators representing the entire city. And this is the only
part of Virginia which does not have one Senator. In other words, all
the other Senators of the forty Senators in the Virginia Senate, excepting
these three, are in a single-member district, the same as our Congressmen
are.
Sweeney: After Henry Howell's defeat in the 1969 gubernatorial
primary many liberals supported Republican A. Linwood Holton. What did
you think of this move?
Stern: I thought of it as almost
inevitable. You may remember that Henry Howell went back up to Richmond,
called us together, and referred to us as a group of free souls, that
we would be free to do as we pleased after that defeat. And I think
the reason was chiefly, as I've said before, that the Governor acted
in such a way that his treatment - Godwin"s treatment of Henry
Howell was such that, really, he was the one that barred any unity in
the party. I think if it had been left just to Bill Battle and Henry
Howell to work out, it would have worked out very well. I think that
the party
54
would have stayed together. But
after the way in which Godwin treated Henry Howell, as I mentioned before,
we had sent this letter to Godwin saying that as a member of the Democratic
Party we were members of a party where we had as liberals suffered -I
don't think we used the word "liberals" - but anyway,
we had been members of a portion of the party which had suffered defeat
in many primaries but had always supported the candidate in the election,
and we didn't understand his willingness to change the rules of the
game. We thought that he had played a very decisive part after he had
said he would not come into the primary when he did come into the primary
on behalf of Battle on the second go-around. We thought that he not
only had broken his word, which didn't surprise us that much, but the
fact that after we had supported conservative candidates when we had
lost in the primary, such as Byrd in the Senate election of '66, was
just another indication of the fact that there were two rules to the
game, one for the conservative side and one for the liberal side. And
I would say that it wasn't anything that we had anything, really, to
do with nearly as much as the fact that Godwin split the party and was
successful in splitting the party sufficiently to elect Holton. I suppose
now that he's back as a Republican Governor, he would say that this
was a smart move on his part.
Sweeney: In 1971 the AAUP took
a survey which discovered that faculty morale at Old Dominion University
had declined, apparently since President Bugg had come into office. Did
you have any explanation for that? Did you find a different atmosphere
on campus in the early Bugg years as compared to the later Webb years?
Stern: Yes. I think part of the
problem is this. I don't think any president has come onto a college
campus with all the trappings of being the angel Gabriel and a few saints
thrown in that James Bugg had when he came to Old Dominion - the first
time it took the label of Old Dominion University. And I think that
this is part of the difficulty, was that he came so overly - I don't
know - just blown up or whatever you
55
want to call it, but the position
was that here was a man who was going to solve every problem that existed
on campus. And we actually thought he would. I don't know whether you
know it or not, but the first time that President Bugg spoke on campus
he talked about a University Senate and he talked about dissolving a
Faculty Senate and dissolving the Student Senate. And this seemed to
me that this was a rather arbitrary operation by a new president coming
into the campus, so I simply asked him - I think it was the only question
asked at that first talk that he gave - my question was, "Are you
going to abolish the Council of Deans?" And he said, no, the Council
of Deans was absolutely necessary. This, as far as I was concerned,
showed his arbitrariness from the start. Al Teach did go right to work
on a University Senate, and we've had a University Senate ever since.
I would say that some people are satisfied. I'm convinced that the Faculty
Senate gave more voice to the faculty than the faculty as part of the
University Senate has given to the faculty. You have to recognize the
fact that Bugg is a very strong man. He's a very determined individual.
He has his own sense of fairness, and he operates on that. And with
this situation and his determination to change the campus into the image
of what he wanted and his idea that he was going to decide what portions
of the institution were going to be pushed ahead and which were going
more or less to just stay in the outer reaches, the fact that he ordered
the faculty, although none of this has ever been in writing, and this
is one of the problems when faculty differ with the president, but he
virtually ordered and in effect obtained the elimination of the compulsion
of taking language courses here on campus, which I think is a decided
loss. I think an institution on the water, as this one is, with a major
port... He brought in a man to review, Mayhew, to review and make recommendations
for this institution, a man who very obviously knew nothing about Old
Dominion University and, judging from his report, he could have written
it without ever having visited the campus. Now I don't know what attempt
the president made to influence him, but if he made any attempt to influence
him in his report it didn't pay off very much because the report didn't
even pay any attention to the fact that this was really a port community,
and in the field of economics recommended the one course that would
be cancelled was international economics. Obviously a person who would
56
hire a man like this and let a man
with apparently little knowledge of our institution issue a report that
was supposed to guide us. I don't think it ever has because, I think,
President Bugg has been intelligent enough to realize that the man didn't
know what in the world was going on at our institution. I think this
was one of the factors, I think that the factor that we spoke of before,
that the whole situation throughout the country is changing. We have
many too many people competing for far too few positions on college
campuses. The situation was bound to change. One of the ways in which
it has changed has been the fact that in many of the strong states,
such as Michigan, there are any number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect. New York State, the whole SUNY State University of New York
system is in a bargaining agreement operation. In the city of New York
there's a CUNY, City University, which has a bargaining agreement for
the entire organization. I don't know whether this is the direction
of the future or not. I think that there's a very good chance that it
will come about. But I think that this is one of the factors in the
case. And you have to face the fact that President Bugg is not a very
lovable individual, is not at all warm. I think he can be, but I think
it's very rare that he is, and I think that this is one of the factors,
particularly in view of what's happened to Richard Nixon. I think a
good deal of what happened to Richard Nixon was because of personality
as much as any other and became self defeating in the long run. I think
that President Webb has very wisely taken himself out of some contacts
with the faculty which caused friction and let Chuck Burgess take over
many of these friction points which, I think, have made life a good
deal easier for him in this particular year than it has been in the
previous years.
Sweeney: Did you aid in Bingo Stant's race for Congress
in 1968? And would you care to assess the tenure of Representative Whitehurst
as Congressman from the Second District?
Stern: Yes, I aided in Bingo's
race in the primary when he took on Jack Ricksey and won and an election
which the newspapers attributed to the race factor which helped
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Whitehurst defeat Bingo. I don't
know how to assess Bill Whitehurst's tenure as Congressman from the
Second District. We can say that he is probably the most liberal of
the ten Congressmen in the ten Congressional Districts, which means
that he gets an eight percent rating instead of a two percent rating
on the Americans for Democratic Action. I enjoy Bill. I've gone up there,
been friendly, he's been kind enough to give a small group of students,
my wife and myself a luncheon in the dining room of the House and introduce
us to some of his friends in the House. I like him. He was at our house
for dinner and we spent an evening together this year. I guess it's
a little bit unfair to try to ask a man who's pretty much a liberal
to analyze a person who's as conservative as Bill Whitehurst. I would
like to see him move more in the direction of helping the change of
the elections so that the financing was done with' public and private
funds rather than just with private funds. I can understand that his
funds are always adequate or more than adequate. The man is tremendously
sincere. He comes across as very sincere. He believes in what he's saying,
and I think he has a tremendous following. As far as I can judge, his
position is one of those like Downing's, that he's virtually in there
for life if he wants to stay with the Second District. I don't know
what his ambitions are, but I don't think there's anybody who can take
the seat away from him because this would be the year that it could
be taken away from him, and the Democrats haven't even nominated a man
who has held any political office before.
Sweeney: How did you become a presidential
elector in 1972?
Stern: That was really a surprise,
and I think one of the pleasantest honors that has ever come to me.
You see, this in a sense is a misfortune. I didn't know years ago when
I started lecturing in American government that I was going to end up
being a presidential elector because I'd been defining all these years
a presidential elector as somebody who'd been working faithfully within
the party but never accomplished very much and so, when they reached
sort of retirement age, they would make them a presidential elector
as an honor
58
that didn't mean very much but just
because of loyalty to the party. Well, I have been loyal to the party
since '49, and I voted pretty regularly for the Democratic Party, and
I think that voting for party rather than individual is a very intelligent
part of American politics even though it's one of the least understood
parts of American politics. So that in '72 I worked with the group that
took over the city Democratic convention which in turn nominated the
people of the state convention, and I was nominated to the state convention
that year and went out to the state convention. And it was in that process
that I was informed, just before the event took place, that I was going
to be nominated to be the presidential elector for 1972. Well, all I
can say is that I thoroughly enjoyed the honor, but I've had so many
in my lifetime, so many more than I've ever expected, that I would say
that this was a nice thing to be able to add on to a list of, if I were
going to compile a Who's Who or something like that, but I've
never been that much interested in this kind of honor. I'd much rather
be on the city committee or state committee or something where I could
make some decisions that were important, but I enjoyed it.
Sweeney: How has the curriculum in the political science
department changed in the last few years, and what do you find yourself
teaching these days?
Stern: Oh, that is an interesting
question. I could go through the curriculum of the political science
department and I believe that I could find at least ten courses that
I initiated here at Old Dominion University, maybe more. I've never
actually added up the number of courses that I have taught. In a recent
year, in the last year, this year I've been lucky because I have been
teaching three and four preparations up until this time. But I had been
able by just a sheer combination of factors to teach either Virginia
government, which is a course on state government - we just label it
"Virginia government" -but either state government and constitutional
law or municipal government and constitutional law. The third preparation
which I taught until I turned it over to
59
Dr. Harmon, was one in judicial
process. And that was a fascinating course and the course that led to
my interest that caused me to go to Williamsburg at Governor Holton's
invitation to help form the group that became the Citizens' Association
for Justice in Virginia and which I've been on the board ever since.
But, as far as curriculum is concerned, I think we're overly balanced
as far as our numbers of our faculty in the international field. I think
that on the undergraduate field we don't have enough, really, in preparatory
courses for the urban. But we have, I would say, in general about the
broad spectrum that you would expect in an undergraduate program, and
I think a well-balanced one. Part of our interest today is that our
people are going into two graduate programs, the urban studies program,
which was formed basically from the political science graduate program,
and the master of public administration, which I think in the long run
may be a much stronger program and which is formed under the school
of business with our department as a cooperating department. And I think
more and more we will be pulling people in who will be moving in those
directions as those programs become known throughout the area and become
established. I'm hoping we will also pull people in from a lot of other
institutions into those programs. So that we now have thirteen members
full time. The assistant dean, David Hager, does teach part time still
in the department. Our curriculum, as well as our teaching, has become
much more teaching in statistical and computer type of courses as behavioralism
seems to bring in more and more of the department members under its
wing. And this is where so many of the studies are being made these
days.
Sweeney: The final question - after the defeat of
Henry Howell in 1973 by Mills Godwin, I was wondering what your reaction
was? Of course, Howell received over half a million votes, and I was wondering
if you saw it as just another defeat in Virginia for liberal forces or
whether you saw this as signaling an end to the long conservative domination
of Virginia politics?
Stern: The end of the conservative
domination of Virginia politics, I think, was signaled by Pollard's
defeat,
60
as far as the Democratic Party was
concerned, in '69 when in a three-way race the remnants of the Byrd
machine in '69 were able to get only about twenty-two percent of the
vote for Pollard. I'm convinced that the conservative wing of the Democratic
Party is moving over, pretty much lock, stock, and barrel, to the Republican
Party. And I don't think that the Democratic Party will ever be under
the conservative domination again. So that the future of the Democratic
Party really depends, really, on two men than on the rest of us put
together. If some modusvivendi can be found between Henry
Howell and Andrew Pickens Miller so that these two men and the supporters
can work together and plan together for future Virginia politics, I
think the chances are going to be very good that the Democratic Party
will come back and will be able to regain the governorship and senatorships
as well. Now, this may not happen. If it doesn't happen, then I think
the chances are that the Republicans will be able to virtually decide
who's going to be our Senators and Governors for a good time to come.
And Joe Fitzpatrick is state chairman of the Democratic executive committee,
of course, and has the major function of trying to bring the two wings
of the party together. But you can't call Andrew Pickens Miller's group
anything but moderate, and, if you want to, you can call Henry's the
liberal wing. But there's just no real wing of the conservative Democratic
Party that has that much authority in Virginia today. That doesn't mean
that there aren't a lot of conservative Virginia Democratic Senators
and Delegates both, but just that in sheer numbers this half million
that you were just talking about of Henry Howell, which was a fantastic
total for a man who ran without any real newspaper support or any great
support from any radio or television stations or any other great support
except for the fact that the man was able to generate this support personally,
is one of the most astounding personal victories even though it didn't....
(end of tape)
