Godwin: Well, to serve the people of Virginia in the respective offices we were seeking; Mr. Harrison was seeking office of Governor and I decided to run for Lt. Governor in collaboration with him; not necessarily on the ticket because there was no ticket at that time to run on. We were all running with Mr. Harrison because obviously Mr. Stevens was running and it was probable that somebody was going to run against him; I mean run with him, as eventually was the case. So what started out as an informal alignment turned into somewhat of a more formal ticket in the Democratic primary that year. But we ran in order to serve the people of Virginia in the offices that we sought and we were interested in Virginia. We were interested in political life in Virginia; we ran simply because we wanted to be Governor and Lt. Governor

Godwin: In my decision to run for Lt. Governor?

Godwin: Well, he was aware of it, but he certainly had nothing to do with me making the decision to run. When I decided to run, I told Senator Byrd, at that time the older Senator Byrd, that I was going to run. He did not ask me to run; he never asked me to run for any office. I respected Senator Byrd because he was a recognized political leader in Virginia, at that time. I had been pretty much a part of the Byrd organization all my public life as indeed my family was ahead of me. So it was a natural alignment, but so far as Senator Byrd picking Governor Harrison to run or picking

me to run as Lt. Governor; or Mr. Butler to run as Attorney General, he didn't pick any of us. We were his friends and we got his support and his help.

Godwin: Well, we thought that we certainly had the majority of the Byrd organization supporting us, but we were very much aware that there was some defection from the organization. There were good organization people who supported Mr. Stevens and Mr. Boothe and Mr. Boyd. But I think we had the bulk of that support from the so-called Byrd group.

Godwin: No. I don't know that he ever asked me to support him or ever talked to me about supporting him, but I knew that he was considering, of course, running for Governor. I supported Mr. Stevens when he ran for Lt. Governor. I supported him for State Senate when he was somewhat committed to support Albertus Harrison, which is what I did, I made that very plain when I announced for Governor that I would be supporting Mr. Harrison and Mr. Stevens knew that I wasn't supporting him.

Godwin: Nothing personal in that regard at all. It just happened to be a political alignment that I was more compatible with the group that was supporting Mr. Harrison than I was with the group of people the leaders of whom were supporting Mr. Stevens.

Godwin: Well, I would make no judgment on that. There was some talk around about it at the time, even later in the campaign. But, I never suspected that he was giving any serious consideration to getting out - he had an organization of his own, he had some very good people supporting him, and he had a measure of support all across the state. I did not

anticipate that he would withdraw, although it was suggested by certain people that he considered that. I never felt that he gave any real consideration to it.

Godwin: Some considerable concern because most of the people that were allied with the Byrd faction were opposed to that type of highway financing. I would say that our position was one of somewhat total opposition to that concept of bond financing for highway construction and improvements. It was an issue that was clearly drawn. People could understand it and the majority of people in Virginia were opposed to it at that time.

Godwin: That's correct.

Godwin: I might interject that that was somewhat a follow-up to what Senator Ted Dalton had proposed in his campaign for Governor against Tom Stanley a few years prior to that, just before the General Election. I've forgotten what year it was, but is was the year that Governor Stanley was elected. So that Dalton came out in favor of a highway bond program which in many people's minds was perhaps the major reason he was defeated in that race by Governor Stanley.

Godwin: Well, I don't know specifically going back that far. We're talking now about a time that was some years ago. But in general, Virginia had not serious problems with industrial development program to let the economy of Virginia offer more employment and better employment as had been carried

out by other states. I think Mr. Harrison sensed the need to go forward with such a program and he proposed the creation of a new industrial development effort in Virginia that would be a new division of the Governor's office and give the prestige of the Governor and the office, they would lead the industrial development effort, which he subsequently recommended and was enacted into law upon his being elected Governor. That did much to revitalize the economy in Virginia. As I recall now, we were having somewhat normal growth in our economy in 1961. It was not particularly a period of depression, but There were just many positive things could be done that weren't being done. That heavy emphasis upon industrial development would have been and was of material benefit to our economy. Much of the industrialization in the northeast part of the United States was beginning to move south. Virginia stood in a good position being midway on the Atlantic Seaboard and in close proximity to a major portion of the nation's population, and with the natural advantages that we had to offer: good government, reasonably low level of taxes, a work force that was not too dominated by labor or by the labor union forces. We had an attractive economic climate that Mr. Harrison felt that we could capitalize on and get our share among the southern states so that new growth and new industry that was coming to this region as indeed it did come.

Godwin: No. No, our relative position wasn't all that bad, but we saw an opportunity to do better and we knew that there were certain needs that the state had that were not being met with the then-existing revenue. Our school program needed some added money; we needed to do something for our mental hospitals; our public health programs and nearly all of the state's programs were standing in need of additional funding. And this was one way to get additional revenue without having to impose new taxes.

Godwin: Well, I don't think that we did anything different than what we would have done had Mr. Stevens not been running. It is true that he supported certain programs that, such as bonded debt programs that we weren't particularly interested in supporting at that time. But I don't know that he forced

Mr. Harrison to outline any programs that he as not supporting at the beginning. I wasn't aware of that. I think that Mr. Harrison being a gubernatorial candidate had a program of his own, irrespective of what Mr. Stevens was proposing. That was what Mr. Harrison felt was good for the state and he went forward with that program.

Godwin: Well, we knew that it would be a difficult campaign. Even though it was a primary election, because there was a very definite choice that existed between the ticket which Mr. Harrison headed and the ticket that Mr. Stevens headed. Mr. Stevens, I might add, was certainly not a liberal or a radical in the sense that Henry Howell was in later years. Mr. Stevens had been pretty much a part of the organization a good part of his public life and he had supported the Byrd program pretty much. He veered away from it during the campaign and that's really what did him in, in the final analysis. But we knew that it would be a difficult campaign because there had been previous campaigns in which the Byrd organization had been challenged, in particular by Col. Francis Pickens Miller and others, but the organization had survived. We felt that they would win again as indeed th would win again as indeed they did. Mr. Harrison was a very popular individual in his own right; extremely personable, articulate, and had good credentials to seek the Office of Governor. He made a fine impression on the people of Virginia as he went around the state. We were supportive of his efforts as best we could - we had problems of our own. I had a very vigorous opponent for Lt. Governor and so did Senator Butler for Attorney General. And much of the fight in the campaign for the primary elections in 1961 really centered on the Lt. Governor's race because my opponent was Armistead Boothe; who was not recognized as a conservative by Virginia standards; though a brilliant individual and quite well- versed in state government. He had been in the General Assembly with all of us and was a man of some stature. But he held a political philosophy that was not very much in tune with the Byrd political group in Virginia. The lines of differences were more clearly drawn perhaps in the Lt. Governor's race, perhaps than in either of the other two races, and much of the public discussion that went on involved the Lt. Governor's race as well as the Governor's race. So obviously it was a ticket that was, on the one hand, more was regarded perhaps as somewhat more conservative (the Harrison ticket) than the Stevens ticket in the minds of most voters of that time.

Godwin: Well, you might say that to a degree. We didn't look upon Mr. Stevens, or of Mr. Stevens' supporters, as being liberal or radical; obviously he had some conservative support. But he did not have the kind of following among the conservative leadership that Mr. Harrison had. Mr. Stevens found his support from the active backing of his candidacy by some of the organized groups in Virginia who had perennially been foes of Byrd organization; such as the labor groups in Virginia, the AFL-CIO leadership and some elements of the black leadership the supported Mr. Stevens, Of course, this more clearly drew the line between the candidates, Not that Mr. Stevens preferred that type of leadership particularly, but he welcomed it, I'm certain, almost any candidate would. We wouldn't have told them not to have voted for us if they indicated they would've voted for us, but we knew they were from the other group. Mr. Stevens, if you recall, made a speech during the campaign in Winchester that was highly controversial and highly out of character, in a way for him, in which he went to the home town of Senator Byrd to blast him and many of the Byrd policies in Virginia. As you know, I'm sure, from your research, how Senator Byrd very quickly produced a letter Mr. Stevens had written to him praising the Byrd organization just a few months prior to that. At which time I'm sure that Mr. Stevens hoped that he would have the Byrd support. But when it was obvious he wasn't going to get it, he turned against the organization during the campaign. I think this influenced a lot of people in Virginia to vote for Mr. Harrison.

Godwin: Well, I think that was political rhetoric from the campaign in which Mr. Boothe knew that he did not have the support of the Byrd leadership and naturally he was attacking that element of the Virginia political leadership. It certainly drew more clearly for everybody to see the differences that existed between us. And that flowed over to a certain extent to the Governor's race. All of it more clearly established by election day the difference in the philosophies and the approach to what they would do as Virginia's governor.

Godwin: Oh, yes.

Godwin: Well, their reaction was somewhat like you would have anticipated. It spurred greater activity on the part of the Byrd people to support the Harrison ticket and thereby oppose the Stevens ticket. And it was of material benefit to all of us who were running along with Mr. Harrison.

Godwin: Well, I viewed that as what I had anticipated would happen from the beginning. I wasn't particularly alarmed about that. I was somewhat comfortable with that situation because as long as they wanted to run against the Byrd organization, in opposing me, that didn't make me unhappy.

Godwin: I didn't get your question.

Godwin: Oh no, we continued to do what we had set out to do from the beginning and that was to carry on a positive campaign for Virginia's progress of true economic development and better funding of state programs and keeping Virginia on a progressive path with the sound personal policy to back it up.

Godwin: Well, I don't think the leadership of the campaign was chosen particularly because of the political help that the individuals could bring; they were all good people. I would reject your statement that Mr. Blackburn was one of the young Turks. I don't think that's correct. But Mr. Blackburn was a very conservative young delegate from Lynchburg. And he was not one of the so-called "Young Turks". In the years just previous to that, as is my recollection of it, Mr. Hicks may have been a bit more moderate in his political views which certainly Mr. Batten was a recognized conservative thinker, but a progressive man in his own right. I suppose anybody running for office would want to choose people to direct their campaign that would be acceptable as possible to as many of the electorate as they could; certainly we gave some consideration to that. Mr. Harrison did in naming these people. They were all good people and I think they were named on the basis of the contributions they could make to the campaign.

Godwin: Well, they helped us organize the campaign in the localities around Virginia. They consulted Mr. Harrison as to issues; what he ought to be saying, what position he ought to be taking beyond what he was already taking. They were simply the leadership of the campaign to see that the mechanics of the campaign were properly utilized to get the maximum results.

Godwin: Well, of course they were influential people in the state. Mr. Blackburn was the only one of the three of them as I recall who had had any- who had held any political office. Mr. Hicks had been Assistant Attorney General and Mr. Blackburn was in the General Assembly. The other one was Mr. Frank Batten, right, yes and of course he was a newspaper man in Norfolk. So they all had political expertise, but I don't think they were chosen on the basis they were politicians in the normally accepted sense of that term. Mr. Hicks had been one of Mr. Harrison's assistants in the Attorney General's office who had been helping him with the campaign even before his coming aboard as a full-time participant in the campaign.

Godwin: Well, we would have been interested in them supporting us if they would have done it; but we knew that since we were looked upon as Byrd people, that the chances of labor leadership supporting us were practically remote. Mr. Boothe had been the spokesman for these politically- minded labor people and hand advocated certain measures in the General Assembly that the labor union officials very much desired, such as an attack upon our Right-to- Work Act. Certainly while Mr. Stevens in my opinion, was never as liberal in his views as Mr. Boothe, of course he didn't turn away from the labor support. And I don't know that we would have turned away from it had it been available to us; but the realities of the thing were such that they always supported anti-Byrd people. So we knew that they weren't going to be supporting us.

Godwin: I think the words speak for themselves. That's the way I felt and I don't know that I feel any different from that today.

Godwin: Well, they wanted to be the dominating political influence in the state and I don't think that the leadership of the AFL-CIO at that time or since are the kind of people who hold the political convictions that I can support, or that the majority of the people of Virginia support. If we had listened to the labor leadership in Virginia, we wouldn't have had a Right-to-Work Act in this state. Which I happen to feel, as I said in that campaign, that I felt that the Right-to-work Act in Virginia was really the Declaration of Independence really for the working man in Virginia. I don't happen to share the view that any man ought to have to pay a tribute by way of dues to any labor union in order to get a job. I don't think

that a man ought to have to belong to a labor union in order to be employed. I felt that very passionately at that time. I share that view today. And that's one of the great differences that existed between us in this campaign. The people of Virginia spoke with, I think, with reasonable voice that they didn't approve of it either. They don't approve Of today. The Right-to-work Act has become so ingrained in the Virginia political philosophy that a candidate for public office now won't even suggest that it ought to be . . . (tape stops)

Godwin: The people of Virginia.

Godwin: Because of the election of Gov. Harrison set the stage for much of what was to follow. He was able to command the unified support of the General Assembly and the Democratic Party. He was able to articulate Virginia's opportunities as well as its problems, its shortcomings. I think he prepared the people of Virginia, helped to pave the way by the things that he did up to the point when I succeeded him in 1965. Having worked with him so closely as Lt. Governor, fairly aware of his concerns, the way we saw events that were unfolding. I think Mr. Harrison prepared the people of Virginia from the transition of frustration and a period of disenchantment with what had happened during the school integration period. And turned the attention of the people away form the problems that we had had to the opportunities that awaited us. And his role as Governor of Virginia in my judgment has never been given the credit that it should have properly received. Because he did not bring to pass the things that he saw in the future because he was only Governor for four years. But he did so many things to put in place the building blocks that set a good foundation for what was to come: sales tax, with quieting people's concerns of other things, setting up industrial development programs in Virginia, and being the kind of Governor that he was - very dignified, he was the epitome of the Virginia gentleman. And gave to Virginia a period of tranquility and reassurance of what was Virginia government, and the people it represented.

Godwin: I do not think that Mr. Stevens would have become a liberal, even if he had won. I do think that he would have had much greater difficulties with the General Assembly in passing his programs than Mr. Harrison did. I think he would have continued to have had the problem of fighting the remnants of those forces in the Byrd organization that were strong at the time, overwhelming in the General Assembly. You've got to bear in mind Mr. Harrison enjoyed, in my judgment, at least three fourths support of the State Senate and House of Delegates when he ran in that primary. Mr. Stevens didn't enjoy that kind of relationship. He would have had a difficult time. I think Virginia would have gone through a period of further frustration, of lack of getting together and molding the political character of the state. I think there would have been a lot of infighting - not as bad as befell Governor Price during his administration - but certainly not the harmony that prevailed, and that Mr. Harrison was able to promote. It just wouldn't have happened if Stevens was elected. It wouldn't have happened had Boothe been elected with him, because his views weren't much foreign to basically what Stevens' were, and what most of the people of Virginia felt. That's my own evaluation.

Godwin: No, I think you have covered much of it. It was a very spirited campaign and one that those of us who were involved in it will, certainly remember in ways that others would not. It was a period in Virginia politics that was interesting and exciting. It was one of the high marks of the Byrd organization's strength. It was, I think, a reaffirmation by the people of Virginia that they thought that overall the Byrd people had been good to Virginia but they came up short in some particulars. Governor Harrison, through his own initiative and by the weight of his own personality was able to profit from, I would like to think, that the results of '61 were but a prelude to what took place 4 years later. I probably have a very biased opinion of that because I can't be too objective perhaps when I was that much involved. But never in my judgment has there been and I've heard this said by many other people - A closer relationship between a Governor, a Lt. Governor, and an Attorney General that existed during the Harrison administration. And never had there been a transition from one Governor to another which was any more smoothly carried out than was the transfer of power from the Harrison administration to the Godwin administration. We happened to be close personal friends, Mr. Harrison and myself, we went to the legislature together

the same day. He was at the Senate in January 1948 and I went to the House that same day. We have been attorneys in south side Virginia, we were familiar with each other, we were comfortable with each other, and we were compatible with each other, and we were compatible on a personal basis as well as a political basis. I enjoyed his confidence and certainly he showed every indication of having confidence in me. He encouraged me early to try to succeed him, and he did everything appropriately within his power to see that I was his successor. He shared with me his thoughts about my turn and what could be accomplished - this was very very helpful to me. And I think that the progressive administration that we enjoyed between 1966-70 was helped along immeasurably by Harrison. I would like to say since you brought this up, as a question, Mr. Stevens and I both lived in adjoining counties. I knew him for many years; I did not dislike him in any way; it was simply a political choice that was made on the basis of what I felt that I had to do. I had no particular criticism of Mr. Stevens' public record because it had been fairly responsible, conservative one. Mr. Stevens was a capable individual, and a very determined, aggressive man. He was never the popular figure that some other politicians were. We had our differences in 1961; and I know that Mr. Stevens felt that my presence on the ticket was harmful to him in home county and in his surrounding counties. And to some extent I think that was true. But despite his disappointments and my concerns about his disappointments, the way he felt about me, I've always been extremely grateful for that in later years after I became Governor. We became friends again, enjoyed a good relationship. I appointed him to the Board of Visitors of Old Dominion University, Old Dominion College at the time, and he supported me publicly and actively when I ran for Governor as a Republican in 1973. I don't think I could have asked for anymore.

Godwin: Well, I would say that it might be a great deal of difference between the situation in '80 from what it was in '60. '61 was a scrap between Democrats and in '81 the scrap will be between partisan candidates. Democrats on the one hand, Republicans on the other. That is of course in itself a major difference. As of this particular point in time, the philosophical differences between the two apparent nominees of the major political parties is not as marked as it was in '61. Therefore there is more confusion in the mind of

the public as to the fundamental philosophical convictions of the two candidates. It was clearer, much clearer in '61 than it is in '80. I think in '61 we had a race for Governor between two very experienced and mature men. In 1981 it looks as though we're going to have a contest between two with relatively little experience and limited public service, more youthful in years and less mature in their political judgments.

Godwin: All right, sir.